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This dissertation consists of three papers on anti-poverty and health promotion 
interventions in East and Southern Africa.   
Attempts to target health goods such as bed nets to poor populations may prove 
ineffective if households resell these goods.  However, wealth and endowment effects 
militate against the sale of in-kind transfers.  The first paper quantifies these effects 
through a randomized experiment in which households received nets for free, received 
a cash transfer and the opportunity to purchase nets, or received only the opportunity 
to purchase nets with their own resources.  The results indicate that very few nets will 
be resold by recipient households. 
The second paper concerns the intra-household allocation of mosquito nets.  
The proportion of children five years and younger who slept under a mosquito net was 
20 percent higher when nets were distributed for free compared to when an equivalent 
cash transfer could be used to purchase nets.  Controlling for the number of nets 
acquired, those received for free were more likely to be used by young children, 
whereas purchased nets were more often used by those members of the household to 
suffer from malaria most frequently.   
The net impact of food aid receipt on farm households production decisions is 
theoretically ambiguous.  The third paper uses household survey and meteorological 
data from Malawi to analyze the effect of receiving food aid on labor supply and input 
use.  Using a lagged weather index as an instrument for food aid receipt, it is shown 
that households who received food aid allocated more labor time to own farm and 
non-farm enterprise activities, and less time to unskilled wage labor, and spent more 
on seeds. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In 2000, the member states of the United Nations adopted eight Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). These global goals included halving, from 1990 levels, 
the proportion of people living in absolute poverty and living in hunger, reducing the 
under-five mortality rate by two thirds, and reversing the incidence of malaria, all by 
2015 (United Nations General Assembly, 2000).  In sub-Saharan Africa, progress 
toward the MDGs has been slow.  While poverty in the region has declined by 8.8 
percent since 1990, this is a far cry from the rate of change required to reach the target 
of halving poverty by 2015 (United Nations, 2007).  Child mortality in sub-Saharan 
Africa remains the highest in the world at 166 per 1000 live births, and has shown 
only a nine percent decrease since 1990. 
While the political will to address the challenges of global poverty appears to 
be rising1, controversies remain over the details of how best to do so.  For example, 
whether insecticide-treated bed nets, a highly cost-effective tool for malaria 
prevention, should be sold to households in rural Africa or given free of charge is 
hotly debated within the public health and donor communities (Roberts, 2007).  The 
debate over food aid, one of the main tools in the fight against hunger, is similarly 
charged.  Food aid and has been shown to mitigate the adverse impact of harvest 
failure on child health (Yamano et al., 2005).  However concerns over the disincentive 
                                                
1 ONE (http://www.one.org), Make Poverty History (http://www.makepovertyhistory.org), and End 
Poverty Now (www.EndPovertyNow.ca), are campaigns in the US, UK, and Canada which aim to raise 
awareness of global poverty among the citizens of their respective countries.  All three were established 
since 2005.  According to the media database Lexis Nexis, the number of times the term global 
poverty appeared in major world publications increased from 68 in 1997 to 916 in 2007. 
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effects of free food distribution are repeatedly raised in the media, and have at times 
causes donors to scale back relief (Harvey and Lind, 2005).   
This dissertation aims to contribute to the knowledge base for designing 
effective anti-poverty and health promotion interventions, in the context of East and 
Southern Africa.  The first two papers report results of a randomized experiment 
designed to investigate the valuation and usage of insecticide-treated mosquito nets in 
Uganda.  Insecticide-treated mosquito nets are considered a cost-effective tool for 
malaria prevention.  How best to deliver these to vulnerable populations  through 
market channels or via free distribution  is a subject of fierce debate among policy 
makers.  One concern related to free distribution is whether nets will be used by 
intended beneficiaries.  The first paper reports findings indicating that the vast 
majority of nets received for free will be retained by recipient households.  This is due 
both to the income effect of receiving a net, and to the endowment effect: people are 
reluctant to give up a net which they own.  The second paper reports results of follow-
up visits to households which obtained nets through the experiment. Nets that had 
been purchased were most often used by income-earning adults whereas nets that had 
been received free were more likely to be used for young children.  This result 
contributes to our understanding of how decision-making heuristics not reflected in 
traditional economic models influence behavior, and has important practical 
implications for targeting health goods within the household. 
The third paper addresses concerns over the possible negative effects of food 
aid on agricultural productivity.  This paper use nationally representative household 
survey data from Malawi to analyze the effect of receiving food aid on agricultural 
production decisions.  Critics charge that reliance on food aid creates dependency and 
diminishes recipients incentives to work.  However receiving aid in the planting 
season when cash is scarce may also allow households to be more forward-looking in 
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their production decisions.  Indeed, the results reported in this paper suggest that 
households who received food aid allocated more labor time to own farm activities, 
and less time to unskilled off-farm wage labor, and spent more on agricultural inputs.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
DO FREE GOODS STICK TO POOR HOUSEHOLDS? 
EXPERIMENTAL EVIDENCE ON INSECTICIDE TREATED BEDNETS2,3 
 
Abstract 
According to economic theory, the market will allocate a good to those willing 
and able to pay the most for it.  This suggests that efforts to target durable health 
goods such as insecticide-treated bed nets (ITNs) to poor populations may prove 
ineffective, with the poor reselling donated goods to the non-poor who value them 
more highly.  However, low market demand by the poor may be due to liquidity 
constraints rather than low valuation of nets.  The endowment effect also militates 
against the resale of in-kind transfers.  To what degree liquidity and endowment 
effects attenuate resale of ITNs donated to the poor is of central importance to the 
design of effective malaria prevention policy in Africa and other areas of the low-
income tropics.  We quantify these two effects through a field experiment in Uganda, 
in which households are randomly assigned to receive ITNs, receive cash and the 
opportunity to purchase ITNs, or have the opportunity to purchase nets with their own 
resources.  Our results indicate that very few nets will be resold by recipient 
households. 
 
                                                
2 Authors - Vivian Hoffmann, Christopher B. Barrett, David R. Just 
3 The authors are PhD Candidate, Professor and Associate Professor, respectively, in the in the 
Department of Applied Economics, Cornell University.  We thank Stephen Younger, four anonymous 
reviewers, and seminar participants at Cornell and the University of Maryland for helpful comments on 
an earlier draft.  Special thanks to Gad Ruzaaza of Mbarara University of Science and Technology, the 
field and data entry staff for their tireless work, and the leaders and families of Rubagano Kimuli for 
welcoming us into their communities and homes.  All remaining errors are our own. 
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1. Introduction 
Malaria kills over one million people annually, 90 percent of them in Sub-
Saharan Africa (World Health Organization 2004).  Sleeping under insecticide treated 
bed nets (ITNs) is a highly effective way of avoiding malaria infection.  ITN use has 
been shown to significantly reduce illness and death from malaria across a range of 
transmission environments (Lengeler 2004) and is considered the most cost-effective 
available strategy for control of the disease (Breman et al. 2004).  
The appropriate mechanism of ITN delivery in Africa  free distribution versus 
some degree of cost recovery  is hotly debated.  The main arguments against free 
distribution are the high public cost of this strategy and the need for reliance on 
uncertain support from external donors.  Proponents of a market-based approach argue 
that available funds are not sufficient to cover the entire population exposed to 
malaria, and that private markets are the only way to provide sustainable access to 
ITNs for all who need them.  They reason that such markets will be undermined by 
large-scale distribution of free nets, leaving communities with even poorer access if 
free distribution discontinued in the future (Lines et al. 2003; Lengeler et al. 2007).   
The appropriate mechanism of ITN delivery in Africa  free distribution versus 
some degree of cost recovery  is hotly debated.  The main arguments against free 
distribution are the high public cost of this strategy and the need for reliance on 
uncertain support from external donors.  Proponents of a market-based approach argue 
that available funds are not sufficient to cover the entire population exposed to 
malaria, and that private markets are the only way to provide sustainable access to 
ITNs for all who need them.  They reason that such markets will be undermined by 
large-scale distribution of free nets, leaving communities with even poorer access if 
free distribution discontinued in the future (Lines et al. 2003; Lengeler et al. 2007).   
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On the other side, those advocating mass free distribution of nets claim that 
commercial strategies will neither be able to achieve nor sustain high levels of 
coverage in rural Africa (Curtis et al. 2003).  They point to numerous studies showing 
that the cost of ITNs is often prohibitive for poor rural African households, even when 
nets are highly subsidized (Hanson and Jones 2000, Guyatt et al. 2002, Barat et al. 
2004, Cohen and Dupas 2008). 
Indeed, the positive externalities of ITN use may imply that private demand for 
nets will be lower than the socially optimal level of usage.  When ITN usage is high, 
many of the mosquitoes that transmit malaria are killed and infection rates decline 
even among those not using nets (Magesa et al. 1991, Curtis et al. 1998, Maxwell et al. 
1999, Hawley et al. 2003, Maxwell et al. 2003), with approximately equal benefit 
from personal protection and community-level effects (Curtis et al. 2006).  In a study 
of demand for de-worming medications in Kenya, Miguel and Kremer (2007) 
demonstrate that ongoing subsidies may be necessary to control infectious diseases 
characterized by large positive treatment externalities.4  The emerging consensus 
understanding of malaria control as a public good underlies the recent change in policy 
by the World Health Organization, which now recommends the full coverage of all 
people at risk of malaria in areas targeted for malaria prevention with ITNs (WHO 
2007).   
Both sides of the debate agree that some level of ITN subsidy for the most 
vulnerable groupspregnant women and young childrenis warranted (Müller and 
Albrecht 2003, Lengeler et al. 2007).  This is in fact the current policy in most African 
countries.  Under such a policy of targeted subsidies, basic economic theory predicts 
that at least some beneficiaries will resell their nets to others who place higher value 
on the nets and are able to pay for them.  A local resale market may emerge, or 
                                                
4 Whether externalities are to treatment or prevention makes no difference to their conclusion. 
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entrepreneurs may take advantage of arbitrage opportunities afforded by spatial 
heterogeneity in ITN prices, buying up nets and transporting these to urban centers or 
across borders.    
Whether these nets are retained and used by their intended beneficiaries or 
resold to wealthier households that would otherwise have purchased nets through the 
commercial market affects the efficiency of public expenditures in achieving the 
public health goal of high coverage for the most vulnerable groups (Lengeler et al. 
2007).  Further, the development of a commercial market for nets will be hindered to 
the degree that potential ITN buyers acquire nets through either direct receipt or 
resale. 
The debate over ITN distribution policy echoes elements of the controversy 
over food aid.  If food aid is acquired by households that would otherwise purchase 
food on the market, either by direct receipt or by purchase on a secondary resale 
market, the market price of food will decline, sales volumes will decrease, or both.  
This benefits net food buyers, but harms net sellers, many of whom are also poor.  In 
the long run, lower food prices and marketed volumes diminish expected returns to 
investment in agricultural production or trade and may lead to stagnation in the rural 
economy, just as ITN prices due to the saturation of the market with free or subsidized 
nets could inhibit the development of a commercial ITN sector.   
The first question is therefore whether households given nets for free or at a 
discounted price would otherwise have purchased these through the commercial 
market.  If not, the next question is whether these households, whose valuation of 
ITNs is apparently below the market price, will resell the nets they receive to others 
whose valuation is higher.  While the development of an active secondary market 
would seem a logical consequence of allocating nets through any non-market 
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mechanism, households that are unwilling to purchase a good at a given price may 
simultaneously be unwilling to sell the same good at the same price.    
In considering the distribution of ITNs, three factors contribute to the 
discrepancy between willingness to pay (WTP) and willingness to accept payment 
(WTA).  First, poor households with limited access to cash may be unable to marshal 
the resources to purchase a net on the market despite high WTP given adequate 
resources.  Second, people tend to value a good they own more than the same good if 
owned by someone else (Kahneman et al. 1991).  This tendency, referred to as the 
endowment effect, has been widely documented in economic laboratory settings.  
Finally, in households with more than one decision-maker, the individual receiving a 
free net may value the net more than the person who has primary control over the 
households financial resources.  Assuming that the net recipient has more control 
over a net that he or she receives than over a net acquired by another adult in the 
household, this could affect both retention and usage of nets. 
Through the experiment described in this paper, we test the contribution of 
each of these factors to the difference between WTP and WTA payment for 
insecticide-treated mosquito nets.  Ultimately, we seek to estimate the cumulative 
effect of these three mechanisms on the degree to which free nets crowd out market 
demand, and on equilibrium secondary market resale volume and prices, so as to 
establish whether or not a target populations actual behavior confirms the fears of 
those who expect free distribution of ITNs to prove ineffective or even to undermine 
commercial market distribution of ITNs among non-targeted segments of the 
population. 
Rather than rely on hypothetical questions as previous studies of demand for 
ITNs have done, we use an incentive-compatible experimental design following 
Becker, deGroot and Marschak (1964) in which participants are asked to choose 
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between mosquito nets and a cash payout.  In addition to avoiding poorly understood 
hypothetical bias (Murphy et al. 2005), this design allows us to identify the effect of 
gender-specific preferences independent of financial constraints, which may be 
correlated with gender. 
In the following section, we review the literature on wilingness to pay for and 
retention of free ITNs.  We then describe three reasons why a households WTP for a 
health good may differ from its supply of the same good received for free in Section 3.  
We outline the methods of a field experiment to measure demand for and supply of 
free nets in Section 4.  Section 5 describes results of this experiment, and Section 6 
concludes. 
 
2. Willingness to pay for and retention of ITNs 
Willingness to pay 
Willingness to pay for ITNs has been investigated in a number of African 
countries.  Almost all existing studies of WTP rely on hypothetical questions, though 
some follow these with the opportunity to purchase nets at a fixed price.  An exception 
is a recent study by Cohen and Dupas (2007), who randomized ITN prices across rural 
health centers in rural Tanzania, and found that demand for nets sold at $0.60 was 79 
percent lower than when nets were offered for free.  Noor et al. (2007) tracked ITN 
usage over time among households exposed to three ITN delivery models over three 
years.  When nets were commercially marketed, children in the poorest households 
were less than a fifth as likely to sleep under nets as children in the least poor 
households.  Under free mass distribution, usage was greatly increased and the gap 
between wealth quintiles was eliminated.  Across settings, wealthier households 
exhibit greater hypothetical and actual willingness to pay for ITNs (Onwujekwe et al. 
2001, Barat et al. 2004, Noor et al. 2006).   
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Discrepancies between womens and mens WTP for nets have been found in 
both directions.  In Ethiopia, one study found significantly higher WTP among 
women, and attributed this to the greater importance placed on child health by mothers 
than fathers.  However, the same study found lower WTP among single mothers, 
controlling for income (Cropper et al. 2000), suggesting that married womens higher 
WTP may have more to do with the division of domestic responsibilities rather than 
gender-specific preferences over child health.  Other studies found significantly lower 
WTP among women in Sudan and Nigeria respectively (Onwujekwe et al. 2001; 
Onwujekwe et al. 2004).  The authors speculated that this was due to womens lack of 
control over household finances. 
 
Retention of ITNs received for free 
Maxwell et al. (2006) compared ITN coverage between Tanzanian villages 
where nets had been marketed and villages where nets had been provided universally 
and free of charge for the entire population.  In the villages where nets had been 
marketed, only 9.3% of people used nets which were intact and/or had been 
insecticide-treated, and were therefore protective against malaria.  Where nets had 
been provided free, over 90% of the nets were still present and were brought for re-
treatment several years later.  The fact that distribution was universal in the free net 
treatment villages may have limited opportunities for resale.  However, high retention 
of free nets has also been documented where coverage was limited to expectant 
mothers attending ante-natal clinics (Guyatt and Ochola 2003).  Guyatt and Ochola 
found an overall net retention rate of 91 percent, though this result may have been 
biased by their failure to locate 40 percent of the original sample for follow-up 
interviews.   
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3. Household demand for and supply of a health good 
Liquidity and income effects 
There are at least three reasons why demand for and resale supply of ITNs may 
differ.  First, for a poor household without access to credit, the cost of an ITN can be 
prohibitive.  As noted in the preceding section, numerous studies have shown financial 
constraints to be a significant barrier to mosquito net ownership across rural Africa.  
Distributing ITNs free of charge overcomes the problem of binding cash liquidity 
constraints, and also represents a significant income transfer in kind. Even if the 
transfer is entirely inframarginal, so that standard theory of the consumer predicts that 
in-kind and cash transfers will have identical effects (Southworth 1945), one would 
expect some portion of this additional income to be allocated to purchasing ITNs.  As 
a result, the price at which an individual is willing to sell a good received for free will 
be higher than the price at which the same person is willing to purchase it out of his or 
her own resources if no transfer is received.5   
 
Endowment effect 
The endowment effect refers to the phenomenon, documented extensively in 
laboratory settings that, even controlling for the wealth effect, people are willing to 
pay less for an item than the amount they would charge for the same item conditional 
on owning it (Kahneman et al. 1991).  For example, consider two individuals, A and 
B, with identical preferences.  Person A receives a bednet and person B receives a 
                                                
5 According to the permanent income hypothesis (PIH), consumer behavior is affected by 
lifetime expected income (Friedman, 1957). Under this hypothesis, giving a household an ITN 
should have very little effect on behavior, as the value of this good is small in comparison to 
the lifetime earnings of even the poorest.  However the empirical literature evaluating the PIH 
has been unable to reach a consensus, with about half of studies rejecting the model.  See 
Browning and Lusardi (1996), Browning and Crossley (2001), and Stephens (2008) for 
summaries.  Particularly relevant to this study is the finding by Keeler et al. (1985) that the 
marginal propensity to consume out of windfall income amounting to less than 20% of annual 
permanent income is greater than one.  
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cash transfer of equivalent value.  If person B is then willing to pay a maximum of X 
for a bednet, the endowment effect implies that person A will demand Y > X to sell 
his or her net.  Kahneman et al. attribute the endowment effect to loss aversion (the 
tendency to prefer avoiding losses to acquiring gains) or status quo bias.  Boyce and 
coauthors (1992) show that the gap between what an individual is willing to pay in a 
buying mode and what s/he demands as compensation in a selling mode is greater for 
goods to which subjects ascribe moral considerations.  This additional effect may 
exacerbate the difference between willingness to buy and sell prices for ITNs when 
these are promoted with reference to child health. 
 
Heterogeneity of preferences within the household  
Preferences are widely believed to differ systematically between men and 
women.  A number of studies have shown that a greater share of income in the hands 
of women is associated with higher household expenditures on education and food 
(Thomas 1990, Hoddinott and Haddad 1995), whereas men report a greater preference 
for status goods and capital investments (Kusago and Barham 2001). 
Married women in traditional societies often have limited control over the 
households financial resources. At the same time, mothers are commonly the 
recipients of goods distributed by government or non-governmental organizations and 
intended for child use.  As a result, the decision to purchase and the decision to sell an 
ITN received for free may be made by distinct individuals within the household.   
Consider a hypothetical household in which each parent acts without regard for 
the others welfare.  In this household, the man controls all the income from the family 
farm or non-farm enterprise, as well as any transfers he receives.  His wife controls 
only the cash or in-kind transfers which she personally receives.  If the woman values 
nets but her husband does not, then the household will exhibit very low market 
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demand for ITNs.  Indeed, a net given to the man might be sold for cash, if possible.  
However, if a net is given to the woman, it is less likely to be sold, since she both 
values and controls this resource.  A recent empirical study of the US Food Stamp 
Program (Breunig and Dasgupta 2005) suggests that heterogeneity of preferences 
within the household explains the higher marginal propensity to consume food out of 
food stamps than cash income. The same mechanism could be at play with respect to 
ITNs.  
The present research measures both willingness to pay for and to sell ITNs in 
the same population.  This allows us to quantify the discrepancy between WTP and 
willingness to accept payment for free nets, and thus to estimate the degree to which 
free nets crowd out market demand, both directly and through sales of nets from 
targeted recipients to others. 
 
4. Setting and Data 
We conducted this research in Mwizi sub-county, Mbarara district, in western 
Uganda.  Net ownership in Mwizi is very low: only five nets per thousand people were 
treated with insecticide during the governments most recent net dipping campaign in 
2005.   We chose the two study villages, Rubagano (population approximately 1300) 
and Kimuli (population approximately 900), for their rural location and remoteness 
from markets.  Hay et al. (2005) show that malaria transmission is much more intense 
in rural than urban areas.  Remoteness from markets ensured that participants 
valuation of ITNs would be affected as little as possible by a reference market price, 
and that WTP values are unlikely to be substantially biased by saturation of the 
demand for ITNs. 
Consumption data was collected through a household survey.  A household 
member was asked to recall the quantity and amount paid for 46 food and drink items 
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consumed over the past week by household members.  For home-produced goods, 
respondents were asked to state the approximate value.  Respondents were also asked 
how much the household had spent during the past month on 15 non-durable, non-
health items including water, fuel, matches, soap, and transport, and during the past 
year on tuition and other educational expenses, small household items, clothing, and 
books.  The average daily value of per capita consumption calculated in this way was 
$0.65.  This is very close to the $0.61 daily per capita household final expenditure 
reported by the World Bank in 2005 for Uganda.  Almost all households in the sample 
earned at least some of their living from farming, and home produced goods accounted 
for 50 percent of consumption on average. 
Conventional (untreated) nets are available in the weekly rural market about 2 
hours walk away from the study villages at a price of approximately $2.72.  These are 
about half as protective for preventing malaria as insecticide-treated nets (Guyatt et al. 
2002).  Higher-quality nets bundled with insecticide treatment kits are available in 
Mbarara, the closest urban center, for approximately $5.44.  A motorcycle ride to 
Mbarara costs $7.63. 
The long-lasting Olyset® insecticidal nets offered through the experiment 
described here are not commercially available in Uganda.  Insecticide is incorporated 
into the polymers of which these are constructed, and remains effective throughout the 
nets estimated 5-year lifespan.  Other ITNs must be retreated with insecticide at least 
once a year and tear more easily than the heavy-duty Olyset nets.  Once nets are torn, 
which is almost a certainty in rural settings (Shirayama et al. 2007, Smith et al. 2007), 
they are ineffective for preventing malaria unless insecticide-treated. Because of this, 
and because retreatment are generally low, especially in Africa, the World Health 
Organization now recommends usage of only long-lasting insecticidal nets for 
subsidized or free distribution (WHO 2007).  These nets have been distributed by 
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international organizations in a few areas within Uganda, including the sub-county 
adjacent to Mwizi.     
Malaria is a serious health problem in the study area.  Respondents reported 
that 90 percent of household members suffer from the disease at least once a year.  
The economic burden of malaria in this sample was very high: the treatment cost and 
forgone labor income of a single malaria episode amounted to $17.85 or 7.2 percent of 
the value of annual per capita non-health consumption.  These figures are similar to 
the private costs of malaria reported in a recent review, which ranged from $15.26 in 
Congo to $20.56 in Rwanda (Cropper et al. 2004).  The toll of malaria on lives is also 
large; 79 percent of respondents reported that someone they knew had died of malaria.  
Despite the widespread experience of malaria as a costly and often fatal disease, and 
despite the fact that 88 percent of respondents correctly stated that malaria is 
transmitted through mosquito bites, only 10 of the 193 participating households were 
using nets before the study. 
 
5. Methods  
Sample selection, treatment assignment, and attrition 
Households that included a child aged up to five years or a pregnant woman 
were eligible to participate in the study.  A list of all such households in each village 
was provided by the village chairmen.  Of these, all 41 of the single-headed 
households identified and an additional 152 dual-headed households, representing 
approximately 90 percent of the total eligible, were selected to participate.6  Either the 
head or spouse in each dual-headed household was randomly selected to be the 
participant for that household.  Half of the single participants and a third of the 
                                                
6 Eleven households with children older than five years were mistakenly included in the sample.  These 
are retained in the present analysis. 
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married female and married male participants were randomly assigned to a cash 
transfer treatment in which they were given cash; approximately the same number in 
each group were assigned to a free nets treatment.  The remaining third of married 
participants were not given nets or cash, but were given the opportunity to purchase 
nets with their own resources (own cash treatment).7  This group was told two weeks 
ahead of time that they would have the opportunity to purchase a single mosquito net 
with their own money, and were given a small monetary inducement of approximately 
$0.50 to come to a bidding session.  Table 2.1a shows the number of participants 
assigned to each treatment by gender and marital status.  All households in the cash 
transfer and free nets treatments sent a representative to the bidding session, but 3 of 
the 50 households assigned to the own cash treatment failed to participate.  
Participants who missed their assigned session were allowed to attend a later session.    
 
Table 2.1a: Sample by assigned treatment, reported family structure, and gender 
of assigned participant       
  Free nets Cash Own cash Total 
Male 25 25 25 75 Married 
Female 25 27 25 77 
Male 1 2 0 3 Single 
Female 20 18 0 38 
Total  71 72 50 193 
 
Table 2.1b: Sample by actual treatment, family structure and gender of 
participant 
  Free nets Cash Own Cash Total 
Male 24 25 22 71 Married 
Female 29 24 24 77 
Male 1 2 0 3 Single 
Female 20 18 1 39 
Total  74 69 47 190 
 
 
                                                
7 One of these was subsequently re-classified as single since she did not live with her husband. 
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An effort was made to reassign the person to a session of the same treatment, 
however this was not always possible.  Staff and respondents were unaware until a 
session began whether they would receive cash or bednets.  The reassignment of 
individuals between treatments is therefore unlikely to have introduced bias.   
A number of households sent a representative other than the one randomly 
assigned.8  This person was asked to find the assigned participant.  If the 
representative insisted that the assigned participant was absent and would not be able 
to attend an alternative session, other community members were asked to verify this.  
In several instances, others contradicted the claim of the household representative and 
the intended respondent was eventually found.  However for 14 of the 190 
participating households, a non-randomly assigned individual participated.  Because 
we are interested in the actual behavior of men and women, we use the actual rather 
than assigned gender of participants in this analysis.  Table 2.1b shows the final 
number of participants (after attrition and reassignment) in each treatment by gender 
and marital status. 
 
Experimental procedures 
In the cash transfer treatment, we gave respondents enough local currency to 
purchase up to three family-sized, long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) at the 
maximum price of $7.63 per net.   In the free nets treatment, we gave respondents an 
equivalent number of nets.  We told participants that the cash or nets, received at the 
beginning of the session, were compensation for their participation in the study, and 
that they were free to exchange or keep these as they wished.  A member of the 
research team fluent in the local language read a statement about malaria and the 
                                                
8 We did not record the number of households initially sending an individual other than the one 
randomly chosen. 
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greater vulnerability of young children and pregnant women to the disease and 
demonstrated how to hang a mosquito net and tuck it under the corners of the bed or 
sleeping mat.  A villager who had received six of the same type of LLIN through a UN 
project told each group that these nets were effective at killing insects and had 
prevented malaria in her family during the months they had used them.  The same 
team member then explained the bidding procedure, and told participants the possible 
prices that could be drawn as he placed one ping-pong ball representing each possible 
price in a bucket. 
The auction mechanism worked as follows (see the appendix for scripts).  
Participants placed tokens representing currency in envelopes to indicate their bids.  
Those in the cash transfer and own cash treatments indicated the maximum they were 
willing to pay for one net, two nets, and three nets (if applicable) by placing tokens in 
up to three separate envelopes.  In the same way, those in the free nets treatment 
indicated the minimum amount of cash they were willing to accept to relinquish one, 
two, and three nets.  Research staff assisted with bids if needed, but participants were 
asked to keep their net bids as confidential as possible. Before bidding on the nets, 
three public rounds were conducted in which food items and pencils could be 
exchanged for cash. 
After the research team recorded all bids, one of the participants drew a ball to 
select the price.  In the cash treatments, participants who had bid at least as much as 
the drawn price for a given number of nets exchanged cash for that number of nets.  
For example, in a three-net session  in which the price drawn was p, if a participant bid 
at least 3p for three nets, he or she would buy all three nets for 3p.  If the bid was less 
than 3p for three nets but at least 2p for two nets, he or she would buy two nets for 2p, 
and if bidding less than 2p for two but at least p for one, he or she would buy one net.  
Finally, if a participant bid less than 3p, less than 2p, and less than p for three, two and 
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one net, respectively, he or she would keep the cash and receive no nets.  Transactions 
for the free net sessions followed the same logic, with participants selling back the 
nets they had received at the randomly drawn price.9  The procedure in the own cash 
treatment was the same as in the cash transfer treatment, except that participants were 
not given cash, and had the opportunity to purchase only one net. 
 
6. Results 
Balance across treatments 
Before discussing outcomes across treatments and sub-groups, we check that 
the randomization was successful.  Table 2.2 gives the means and standard errors of 
relevant variables for each treatment group and each gender/headship category.  The 
only variable that varies significantly across the free nets and cash transfer treatments 
at the five percent level (p=0.044) is number of children in the household aged five 
years or younger.  This presents some concern, since a message focused on child 
health was given to respondents and may have had a differential impact on those with 
more young children.  We include this variable in the multivariate analysis below in 
order to isolate its effect in determining willingness to pay for or retain nets.  The own 
cash group differs from the pooled cash transfer and free nets group, again in the 
number of children, and also in number of women aged 15 to 45 (p=0.08), as well as 
(by design) in the proportion of single parents and number of nets offered for sale.  
The lower number of children in the own cash group (p=0.002) is due to the fact that 
these sessions were held on the last day of fieldwork and thus did not allow for re-
sampling to replace households that did not meet eligibility criteria. 
                                                
9 Two participants wished to change their bids after the price for nets was drawn. They were allowed to 
do so and their bids were altered accordingly. 
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Valuation of free nets and the endowment effect 
The high reported costs of malaria in Mwizi are reflected in high compensated 
demand for ITNs.  Seventy-three percent of the respondents who had received free 
nets were unwilling to accept the maximum price of $7.63 in exchange for even one of 
their nets.  This price represents 3.1 percent of annual per capita non-health 
consumption, and 6.9 percent of annual per capita cash expenditures.  Of those given 
cash and the opportunity to purchase nets, 49 percent were willing to pay the full price 
for the nets.  The average bids among the free nets and cash transfer groups were 
$7.16 and $5.94 respectively, significantly different at p<0.0001.10  Because bids were 
bounded from above and so many were clustered at the maximum, the differences 
between WTP and WTA values are likely understated.   
 
Gender effects 
Pooling the free nets and cash transfer treatments and splitting the sample by gender, 
womens bids are slightly higher at $6.71 compared with $6.28 for men, but this 
difference is not statistically significant.  Excluding the mostly female single-headed 
households narrows this gap to $0.26, which is also statistically insignificantly 
different from zero.  This result, which is somewhat surprising in light of the previous 
literature on the effect of womens income on household consumption, maybe be due 
to the fact that 71 percent of married men and 60 percent of married women discussed 
what to do in the bidding session with their spouse.  A participants bid may therefore 
reflect the outcome of an intra-household bargaining process rather than the 
individuals preferences alone.  While this precludes the identification of differences 
                                                
10 The number of bids per household varies from one to three, depending on the number of nets offered, 
which in turn reflects the household size and sleeping arrangements.  In calculating these averages, each 
households mean bid is treated as a single observation.  We do not observe the WTA values of those 
unwilling to sell at the maximum price offered and so assign these a value of $7.63 as a lower bound. 
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across gender, our results are more likely to reflect actual household behavior than if 
participants decisions had been made in isolation.  The difference between single 
mens and single womens willingness to pay in the cash transfer treatment is large 
and statistically significant (Table 2.3), but as there are only two single men in this 
group, we caution against putting much weight on this result. 
 
Table 2.3: Average bid by treatment, family structure, and gender of 
participant 
  Free nets Cash Hypothetical own cash Own cash 
Male 7.02 
(0.22) 
5.85 
(0.42) 
4.03 
(0.49) 
2.85 
(0.38) 
Married 
Female 7.09 
(0.20) 
6.13 
(0.43) 
4.25 
(0.52) 
1.93 
(0.24) 
Male 7.63 
(.) 
1.77 
(0.95) 
. . Single 
Female 7.42 
(0.21) 
6.26 
(0.49) 
1.09 
(.) 
1.09 
(.) 
Total  7.16 
(0.11) 
5.94*** 
(0.26) 
4.08*** 
(0.35) 
2.34*** 
(0.23) 
 indicates a difference between men and women within the household structure (married or single) 
category that is significant at p<0.01;  indicates p<0.05. 
*** indicates a difference between treatments (comparison is with the treatment immediately to the left) 
that is significant at p<0.01.  Tests for significance across treatments are performed on all observations 
(married, single, female, and male) sample. 
 
Willingness to pay out of own resources 
In contrast to the high bid values of those receiving cash or nets, the group 
using their own cash was willing and able to pay an average of only $2.34 for one net, 
suggesting that poverty and binding liquidity constraints greatly limit market demand 
for nets.  Within this treatment, mens average WTP was greater than womens by 
$0.92 (p<0.05).  This reversal of the ordering of mens and womens WTP as we 
move from the cash transfer to the own cash treatment suggests that although women 
value nets as much as or more than men, they have less access to cash with which to 
purchase them.  This serves as a caution that correlation between gender and cash 
liquidity can complicate inference with respect to gender-differentiated preferences. 
 24 
Because two weeks notice may not have been ample time to marshal 
resources, we collected data on hypothetical WTP values from the own cash group in 
addition to the incentive-compatible values elicited through the bidding procedure.  
Respondents were asked how much they would be willing to pay for a net if they had 
unlimited time to save.  These values are higher, $4.08 on average, but still much 
lower (p<0.0001) than the price those receiving cash were willing to pay.  The 
hypothetical WTP values, like the bids of those who received cash or nets, do not 
differ significantly between men and women, reinforcing the inference that cash 
liquidity constrains women more than men in this setting. 
 
Simulated market exchanges 
We first note that if long-lasting insecticidal nets (LLINs) were commercially 
available, our results suggest they would be priced out of reach the households in this 
community.  The nets used in this study were procured at $7.6311, three times the 
average weekly value of cash consumption per capita and well above the maximum 
bid of $5.45 in the own cash treatment. Even the hypothetical WTP values are below 
this lower-bound estimate of the commercial price for 81 percent of households.  The 
majority of respondents in the own cash treatment bid $2.72, the price of untreated 
nets in the local market, or less (Table 2.4).  This suggests an unwillingness to pay 
more for the greater durability or insecticidal properties of LLINs.  
 
 
 
                                                
11 This is higher than the current bulk purchase price of $5.00 paid by ministries of health and 
international organizations when purchasing millions of nets at a time; however we believe it 
is a reasonable estimate of the price a small trader might pay for a few hundred nets, and 
therefore provides a lower bound on the commercial price of LLINs. 
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Table 2.4: Cumulative demand for ITNs in the own-cash treatment 
Price 
(USD) 
Cumulative demand of households in own-cash treatment  
(% of households) 
5.45 10.64 
4.36 12.77 
3.81 21.28 
3.27 23.41 
2.72 53.2 
2.18 57.46 
1.63 63.84 
1.09 76.61 
0.54 100.01 
 
Turning next to the hypothetical secondary market for nets, suppose the 
poorest 40 percent of households (by per capita consumption) in the villages studied 
receive free ITNs to cover all of their household members.  Recipient households may 
decide to use the nets they have received or sell them to others in the community.  
Figure 1 illustrates the demand, supply, and resulting market equilibrium for nets 
under three different sets of assumptions about the willingness of recipients to sell.  
The demand for nets in each case is the same: the cumulative density function (CDF) 
of the own cash buying bids among those in the top 60% of consumption per capita, 
shown in the heavy downward-sloping dashed line.  The poverty line implied by this 
cutoff is 53 cents per capita per day.  
If we ignore both endowment and liquidity effects, then the supply of nets is 
simply the inverse of the demand for nets among the poorest 40 percent in the own 
cash group.  This is the thin dashed line in Figure 1.  The intersection of this 
hypothetical supply with demand occurs at $2.42, approximately one-third of the retail 
price of the nets.  At this price, over half (54 percent) of the nets distributed will be 
resold to non-target households.  This is the scenario that concerns many skeptics of 
free ITN distribution to the poor: ITNs will not stick to intended recipients and the 
predictable reselling will undermine commercial market distribution of ITNs.  
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However, this naïve scenario neglects liquidity and endowment effects, which 
effectively extinguish that concern, as we now show.   
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1. The impact of wealth and endowment effects on demand and supply 
for ITNs  
 
Next we examine how income and liquidity effects change supply while 
leaving out the endowment effect. The long-dashed supply curve is the inverse CDF of 
bids among the poor who received the cash transfer.  The estimated equilibrium resale 
price increases to $2.72, and the number of nets sold drops dramatically to 23 percent 
of those distributed. 
Finally, we plot the actual supply of nets among the poor: the heavy solid line 
is the CDF of bids among the poor in the free nets treatment. This supply reflects both 
the fact that liquidity constraints are overcome when nets are given for free, and the 
endowment effect of the in-kind nature of the transfer.  Taking into account both of 
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these effects, the estimated equilibrium resale price of ITNs jumps to $4.63   over 
60 percent of the retail price  and only 6 percent of nets are resold by 
beneficiaries.12  Even this scenario represents an upper bound on the number of sales, 
since we do not take into account the transaction costs associated with finding a 
willing buyer or seller.   
 
Multivariate analysis 
To investigate the degree to which various factors determine demand for and 
resale of nets, we regress bid values on household per capita consumption, household 
demographic composition, and age, gender, and marital status of the participant, 
controlling for the number of nets received.  We use a tobit model bounded above at 
the maximum price of $7.63 (there were no zero bids).  The dependent variable is the 
respondents average buying or selling bid for up to three nets.  
Considering first the pooled sample (Column 1, Table 2.4), we note the most 
significant determinants of bid values are the treatment indicator variables.  As in the 
comparisons of means above, those receiving nets for free were only willing to sell 
their nets at a price significantly higher  by $2.48 on average, controlling for other 
covariates  than those who received cash were willing to pay.  Those purchasing 
nets out of their own resources bid lower by $4.67 relative to those who had been 
given cash.  Household purchasing power also has a significant effect in the pooled 
sample.  For each additional dollar of per capita weekly consumption expenditure, 
respondents bid an additional $0.20 per ITN. 
Next, we test whether receiving nets for free has any implications on the 
determinants of valuation beyond increasing the intercept through the endowment 
                                                
12 If we use the hypothetical bids from the uncompensated group to construct demand, 69%, 40%, and 
20% of nets are sold in scenarios 1-3, respectively. 
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effect.  Columns 2 and 3 report results of a model comparing the determinants of bid 
values among those in the cash receiving cash and the group receiving nets.  The 
coefficients in Column 2 represent the effect of each variable on the buying bids of 
those who received cash; Column 3 shows the effect on the selling bids of those who 
received nets. 
The behavior of those purchasing nets with cash we have supplied, while less 
directly relevant to policy than that of the other groups, is informative about the degree 
to which purchasing and selling behavior differ, independent of liquidity constraints.  
Buying bids are highly income elastic: for every dollar of per capita weekly 
consumption expenditure, participants bid an additional 31 cents for each ITN, 
implying an income elasticity of willingness to pay of 0.25.  In contrast, the elasticity 
of selling bids is lower at 0.18, and is not statistically significant. 
Controlling for covariates, women bid higher than men by almost $2.00 
(p<0.1), but men are no more likely to sell nets received for free than married women.  
When the participant is a single parent, the endowment effect is much larger, with 
significantly lower buying bids and significantly higher selling bids than married 
participants.  This is in line with our observation that married participants discussed 
what to do in the bidding session with their spouses, and suggests that to at least some 
degree their behavior was determined by this discussion. 
We also find that respondents with more young children in the household bid 
significantly lower when purchasing nets, reflecting the well-known negative 
association between quantity of children and quality of children.  The number of 
young children has no effect when the decision is whether to sell nets received for 
free.   
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Table 2.5: Determinants of bid values1 
 Pooled sample 
Received cash vs.  
received nets 
Used own cash vs. 
received  nets  
  cash treatment
free nets 
treatment 
own cash 
treatment 
free nets 
treatment 
expenditures per capita (USD/week) 0.182** 0.314* 0.269 0.048 0.169 
 (0.087) (0.162) (0.255) (0.113) (0.122) 
age of participant 0.002 0.026 -0.032 0.003 -0.026 
 (0.017) (0.034) (0.056) (0.019) (0.027) 
participant is female 0.334 1.825 0.948 -1.004* 0.470 
 (0.466) (1.111) (1.128) (0.518) (0.552) 
participant is single parent -0.295 -2.924** 2.377 -1.490 1.797* 
 (0.717) (1.415) (1.901) (1.924) (0.950) 
# of members aged 0-5 yrs -0.406* -1.173* 0.246 -0.508** 0.085 
 (0.228) (0.594) (0.525) (0.246) (0.243) 
# of members aged 6-14 yrs 0.106 0.119 0.086 0.109 -0.042 
 (0.170) (0.412) (0.422) (0.206) (0.190) 
female aged 15-45 years -0.446 -0.597 -1.869 -0.003 -0.756 
 (0.574) (1.307) (1.567) (0.606) (0.728) 
# other adults 0.131 0.179 0.799 0.031 0.296 
 (0.317) (0.608) (1.031) (0.512) (0.473) 
number of nets offered 2 -0.085 0.504 -1.276   
 (0.517) (1.066) (1.198)   
free nets treatment 2.689***     
 (0.529)     
own cash treatment -4.744***     
 (0.936)     
constant 6.407*** 4.914 5.985 7.690*** -4.638** 
 (1.545) (3.203) (4.570) (1.291) (1.788) 
Number of observations 186 139 119 
Adjusted R2 0.202 0.099 0.364 
* indicates coefficient is different from zero with p-value < 0.1; ** < 0.05, *** < 0.01. 
1 For the in-kind transfer nets group, we estimate tobit models with an upper limit of the maximum 
price ($7.63).  Bids among the uncompensated group were not clustered at either zero or the maximum; 
we therefore estimate this model using OLS.  
2 Number of nets offered does not vary for the own cash treatment; all participants in this treatment 
were offered one net. 
 
In the final two columns, we test for differences in the correlates of bid values 
when participants are spending their own cash versus when they received free nets.  
The income elasticity of bids is low and not statistically significant for the own cash 
group, suggesting that even for less-poor households, lack of access to cash may be a 
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barrier to acquiring nets.   The lower WTP among women in the own cash group, also 
seen in the comparisons of means, remains statistically significant at p<0.1 in the 
multivariate model.  Finally, as in the cash treatment, participants with more young 
children in the own cash treatment are willing to pay significantly less for nets. 
In sum, standard of living influences willingness to pay for a mosquito net 
even when cash liquidity is not a barrier, whereas willingness to sell is not 
significantly higher among the poor.  Differences in willingness to pay across gender 
seem mainly to capture liquidity constraints, with men able to pay more for nets from 
their own resources but no less likely to sell them than women.  Single heads, who are 
almost exclusively women, are more reluctant to give up nets than married women or 
men, but also less likely to purchase them.  Finally, giving nets for free appears to 
overcome a negative relationship between number of children and demand for child 
health observed in the treatments that used own cash or cash received through the 
study. 
 
7. Conclusion 
That cost is a major barrier to ITN use in rural Africa is well-documented.  
Despite their inability to pay market prices for long-lasting ITNs, we find that very 
few households are willing to sell nets they have received for free.  Distributing nets 
free of charge overcomes liquidity constraints and represents substantial income 
transfer for poor households.  Liquidity and income effects account for 75 percent of 
the difference between the price participants are willing and able to pay, and the price 
at which they are willing to relinquish a free mosquito net.   
A large literature in behavioral and experimental economics emphasizes that 
the decision to purchase a good is not equivalent to the decision to sell.  The 
endowment effect  a reluctance to part with the things one owns  compounds the 
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role of liquidity constraints and income effects in the spread between buying and 
selling prices.  Together, these effects mean that in-kind transfers are likely to stick, at 
least partially, to a targeted group which would otherwise be unable or unwilling to 
pay for a good.  This sharply reduces unintended reselling  so-called external 
leakage  to the non-poor and associated undermining of commercial market 
distribution channels.   
A simulation of the market for nets in the rural western Ugandan villages 
studied shows that only 6 percent of all nets distributed would be sold in an artificially 
frictionless market; if we were to account for the transactions costs of market 
exchange, this estimate would fall further.  The small number of exchanges arises 
from a combination of low uncompensated market demand for nets and high 
compensated demand among net recipients. 
In principle, non-unitary decision-making processes at the household level may 
also cause buying and selling prices to diverge.  In this sample, however, the average 
compensated valuation of ITNs does not differ significantly between married men and 
women, possibly because decisions about how much to pay or charge for a net were 
made jointly by couples.  However, women are less able to pay for nets out of own 
cash resources than are men, implying that marketing nets to poor women will be 
relatively ineffective because of their low purchasing power.  
No participants were able and willing to pay even the wholesale price of a 
long-lasting insecticidal net using their own resources.  This, together with the fact 
very few households were willing to sell free nets, suggests that targeted distribution 
of free or highly subsidized nets to rural households is a viable strategy for achieving 
higher rates of insecticide-treated bednet usage in areas with low existing coverage.  
Our finding that households with more young children are willing to pay less for nets 
but are no less likely to sell nets received for free provides additional support for the 
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emerging consensus that free distribution of ITNs is important for increasing coverage 
of the most vulnerable. 
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G1. In the next phase of this study, you will be given or have the chance to purchase a mosquito net.  
We will then send someone to check how you are using this net while you and your family are sleeping. 
Who would you prefer to do this? (encourage respondent to consult other household members about 
this decision; circle the answer) 
 
1=someone from the community who has been selected at a community meeting  
2=someone from outside the community (one of the staff from this study) 
 
G2. Do you have a preference for the gender of the net checker? (Circle) 1=M   2=F  3=doesnt matter 
 
F8. During the past month, how much did people in your household  spend on: 
Amount  
(000 SH) 
1. Water (not including that recorded in D31)  
2. Fuel for cooking  
3. Matches  
3. Batteries  
4. Electricity  
5. Kerosene & other lighting fuel  
6. Soap (for dishes, personal use)  
7. Laundry soap  
8. Toothpaste and cosmetics  
9. Air time & other communications (not handset)  
10. Newspapers, magazines  
11. Transport fares (bus, boda-boda, special hire)  
12. Fuel for boda, vehicle  
13. Medicines and medicinal herbs  
14. Clinic / Hospital / Traditional doctor fees  
15. Laundry services / house help  
16. Contributions to church / mosque / community group  
17. Funeral contributions  
 
F9. In the past year, how much did people in your household spend on: 
 
1. Home repairs and improvements  
2. Tuition fees / boarding / school uniform  
3. School books and stationery  
4. Kitchen items (pots, pans, stoves etc.)  
5. Plates, cups, cutlery, etc.  
6. Buckets, jerry cans, plastic basins, etc   
7. Electronic equipment (mobile handset, radio, etc.)  
8. Repairs of electronic equipment   
9. Bulbs, switches, etc.  
10. Furniture (beds, chairs, tables, etc.)  
11. Carpets, mats  
12. Mattresses, sheets, blankets  
13. Mosquito nets  
14. Bicycles  
15. Motorbikes, vehicles   
16. Tires and other repairs for vehicles, bicycles  
17. Childrens clothing and shoes  
18. Books (not for school)   
19. Household functions (weddings, parties,)   
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Experiment Scripts 
 
A1. Compensation Statement 
Cash Transfer Treatment: The money you have been given is compensation for your 
participation in this study. You may use this for whatever you wish.  Later today you 
will have an opportunity to exchange this cash for mosquito nets, but you are in no 
way obligated to do so. 
 
Free Nets Treatment: The nets you have been given is compensation for your 
participation in this study. You may use these for whatever you wish.  Later today you 
will have an opportunity to exchange these nets for cash, but you are in no way 
obligated to do so. 
 
A2. Malaria Statement  
 
All treatments:  Malaria is a serious, sometimes fatal disease that is spread through the 
bites of certain mosquitoes.  The symptoms of malaria are fever, headache, weakness, 
vomiting, and loss of appetite.  Children may also suffer convulsions, and adults may 
feel pains in their joints, dizziness and backache.   
 
Malaria is more likely to be serious for young children and pregnant women. In 
Uganda malaria is the number one killer of children under 5 years, and is responsible 
for 6 of every 10 miscarriages.  Grown men and women who are not pregnant may 
also become sick with malaria and may die, but they are less likely to die of malaria 
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than young children and pregnant women.  Severe malaria can also cause mental 
retardation, blindness, and deafness in children. 
 
The mosquitoes that carry malaria usually bite late at night, so an effective way of 
avoiding malaria is to sleep under a mosquito net.  Mosquito nets are especially 
effective for preventing malaria in young children, since children tend to stay in bed 
during the night when mosquitoes are biting.  
 
Mosquito nets are more effective when they are treated with a chemical that kills 
mosquitoes but is safe for humans.  Mosquitoes die when they land on such treated 
nets, so if there is a hole in the net, or an opening between the bed and the net in the 
net they are unlikely to find it.  Also, there are fewer mosquitoes in the house to bite 
people not sleeping under nets or who leave temporarily their nets during the night.  
Most of the mosquito nets you can buy in the market are not treated with chemicals.  
You can buy chemicals to treat these nets which are effective for 6 months.  Then the 
nets must be treated again.   
 
Cash Transfer and Own Cash Treatments: 
[hold up net and pass it around the room for inspection] 
This mosquito net has been treated with special chemicals that are effective for 5 
years.  You will not need to treat this net again, even after washing it.  Also, it is made 
from stronger threads than the mosquito nets found in the market, and will last much 
longer without tearing.   
 
Free Nets Treatment: 
[Everyone is has been given their own net(s), and are asked to inspect them] 
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The nets we have given you have been treated with special chemicals that are effective 
for 5 years.  You will not need to treat your nets again, even after washing them.  
Also, these nets are made from stronger threads than the mosquito nets found in the 
market, and will last much longer without tearing.  Each net is big enough to cover 
two single beds side by side. 
 
All Treatments: 
[demonstrate how the net should be hung over a bed] 
 
A3. Bidding Scripts 
Cash Transfer and Own Cash Treatments: We are interested in finding out how much 
you would pay for (this net / two of these nets / three of these nets), and who in your 
family will use (it / them) if you dont have enough nets for everyone.   
 
We will ask you to tell us the maximum price you are willing to pay for (one net / one 
and two nets / one, two, and three nets).  I will then choose a price randomly.  If the 
price you tell me is higher than the price I choose, you will give me the amount of 
money I have chosen and I will give you the net.  If the price I choose is lower than 
the maximum you are willing to pay, you will keep all the money I have given you 
and I will keep the net. 
 
Under this procedure, it is in your best interest to tell me exactly the maximum you are 
willing to pay; no more and no less.  If you tell me a price that is higher than the 
maximum you actually want to pay, you will be forced to pay this price if I choose it.  
If the price you tell me is lower than the maximum you would pay, then if I draw a 
low price you will not be allowed to buy the nets even if you want to.  
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Free Nets Treatment: We are interested in finding out how much you value the nets 
we have given you, and who in your family will use it them if you dont have enough 
for everyone.  We will ask you to tell us the minimum price at which you are willing 
to sell (one net / one and both nets / one, two, and all three nets).  I will then choose a 
price randomly.  If the price you tell me is lower than the price I choose, you will give 
me the net and I will give you amount of money I have chosen.  If the price I choose is 
lower than the maximum you are willing to pay, you will keep all the money I have 
given you and I will keep the net. 
 
Under this procedure, it is in your best interest to tell me exactly the minimum you are 
willing to accept; no more and no less.  If you tell me a price that is lower than the 
minimum you would want to sell for, you will be forced to sell at this price if I choose 
it.  If the price you tell me is higher than the minimum you would pay, then if I draw a 
high price you may not be allowed to sell the nets even if you want to.  
First, we will practice this procedure with other items.   
 
Cash Transfer and Own Cash Treatments: 
One: I will ask you to tell me the maximum price you are willing to pay for one X.  I 
will then choose a price randomly.  If the amount you are willing to pay for an X is 
higher than the price of one X, you will give me the price and I will give you an X.  If 
the amount you are willing to pay for one X is lower than the price of one X, you will 
keep the money I have given you and I will keep the X.   
 
Two: I will ask you to tell me the maximum price you are willing to pay for one and 
two X.  I will then choose a price randomly.  If the amount you are willing to pay for 
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two X is higher than the price of two X, you will give me the price of two X and I will 
give you two X.  If the amount you are willing to pay for two X is lower than the price 
of two X, but higher than the price of one X, you will give me the price of one X and I 
will give you one X.  If the amount you are willing to pay for one X is lower than the 
price of one X, you will keep all your money and I will keep the X.   
 
Three: I will ask you to tell me the maximum price you are willing to pay for one, two, 
and three X.  I will then choose a price randomly.  If the amount you are willing to pay 
for three X is higher than the price of three X, you will give me the price of three X 
and I will give you three X.  If the amount you are willing to pay for three X is lower 
than the price of three X, but higher than the price for two X, you will give me the 
price of two X and I will give you two X.  If the amount you are willing to pay for two 
X is lower than the price of two X, but higher than the price of one X, you will give 
me the price of one X and I will give you one X.  If the amount you are willing to pay 
for one X is lower than the price of one X, you will keep all your money and I will 
keep the X.   
 
Free Nets Treatment: 
One: I will ask you to tell me the minimum price at which you are willing to sell the X 
I have given you.  I will then choose a price randomly.  If the value at which you are 
willing to sell the X is lower than the price of one X, I will give you the price and you 
will give me your X.  If the amount you are willing to pay for one X is lower than the 
price of one X, you will keep the money I have given you and I will keep the X.   
 
Two: I will ask you to tell me the minimum price at which you would be willing to 
pay for one and two X.  I will then choose a price randomly.  If the amount you are 
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willing to pay for two X is higher than the price of two X, you will give me the price 
of two X and I will give you two X.  If the amount you are willing to pay for two X is 
lower than the price of two X, but higher than the price of one X, you will give me the 
price of one X and I will give you one X.  If the amount you are willing to pay for one 
X is lower than the price of one X, you will keep all your money and I will keep the X.   
 
Three: I will ask you to tell me the maximum price you are willing to pay for one, two, 
and three X.  I will then choose a price randomly.  If the amount you are willing to pay 
for three X is higher than the price of three X, you will give me the price of three X 
and I will give you three X.  If the amount you are willing to pay for three X is lower 
than the price of three X, but higher than the price for two X, you will give me the 
price of two X and I will give you two X.  If the amount you are willing to pay for two 
X is lower than the price of two X, but higher than the price of one X, you will give 
me the price of one X and I will give you one X.  If the amount you are willing to pay 
for one X is lower than the price of one X, you will keep all your money and I will 
keep the X.   
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CHAPTER THREE 
PSYCHOLOGY, GENDER, AND THE  
INTRAHOUSEHOLD ALLOCATION OF FREE AND PURCHASED 
MOSQUITO NETS13,14 
 
Abstract:   
This paper reports results from a field experiment in Uganda.  The proportion 
of children five years and younger who slept under a mosquito net was 20 percent 
higher when nets were distributed for free compared to when an equivalent cash 
transfer could be used to purchase nets.  This effect is attributable to the endowment 
effect (more nets were retained when received for free than offered for sale), and to 
differences in how purchased and free nets are allocated within the household.  Nets 
received for free were more likely to be used by young children.  Purchased nets, on 
the other hand, were used by those members of the household, often adults, believed 
by participants to suffer from malaria most frequently.  When a married woman 
received nets, the probability that her children used these increased with the 
educational attainment of her husband. 
  
                                                
13 I am indebted to Chris Barrett, David Just, and William Schulze for their guidance throughout this 
research.  Annemie Maertens, Hope Michelson, Daniel Benjamin, Jordan Matsudaira, seminar 
participants at Cornell and the NEUDC, and three anonymous referees provided helpful comments on 
earlier drafts.  Special thanks to Gad Ruzaaza of Mbarara University of Science and Technology, to the 
field and data entry staff for their tireless work, and to the leaders and families of Rubagano and Kimuli 
for welcoming us into their communities and homes. Cornell University provided generous financial 
support.  All remaining errors are my own. 
14 Author Vivian Hoffmann. 
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1. Introduction 
Malaria kills over one million people annually, 90 percent of them children 
under the age of five (World Health Organization, 2004).  The use of insecticide 
treated mosquito nets (ITNs) has been shown to reduce all-cause child mortality by 
one-fifth and reduce malaria episodes by half (Lengeler, 2004) and is considered the 
most cost-effective available strategy for control of the disease (Breman et al., 2006).  
In 2000, 44 of the 50 malaria affected countries in Africa committed themselves to 
increasing the use of ITNs by vulnerable populations, in particular children under five 
years of age and pregnant women (Roll Back Malaria, 2000).  In recent years, donor 
funds for ITN promotion and other malaria control measures have increased 
dramatically (Global Fund to Fight AIDS Tuberculosis and Malaria, 2007). 
The appropriate mechanism of ITN deliveryfree distribution versus some 
degree of cost recoveryis hotly debated (Müller and Jahn, 2003).  While mass 
distributions of free nets to families with young children have recently been 
undertaken in a number of African countries, this policy is widely considered fiscally 
unsustainable.15  Some also argue that paying for goods motivates people to use them 
(PSI, 2006).  Indeed, recent work has shown that higher prices can serve to screen out 
those who will not use health goods consistently (Ashraf et al., 2007).     
Although public health messages emphasize that children should use mosquito 
nets, some studies have found that when a household does not have enough nets to 
cover all members, scarce nets are often used by adults rather than children 
(Korenromp et al. 2003, Mugisha and Arinaitwe 2003). On the other hand, studies 
tracking the usage of nets given to pregnant women have found that the vast majority 
of these are used by the women and their newborn infants (Guyatt and Ochola 2003, 
                                                
15 Interviews with Connie Balayo, National Malaria Control Program, Uganda (August 2006); Ali 
Abdullah Suleiman, Zanzibar Malaria Control Division (April 2007). 
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Dupas 2005).  These contrasting results raise the question of whether free net receipt, 
gender of the net recipient, or the child health message that usually accompanies free 
nets is responsible for the apparently higher rates of child usage achieved through free 
distribution programs.  In this paper, I analyze the determinants of intrahousehold 
mosquito net allocation, including the gender of the member who obtained the net and 
whether the net was purchased or received in kind, holding information and wealth 
effects constant. 
The way in which mosquito nets are distributed varies across and even within 
countries.  However, comparing the intrahousehold allocation of nets across program 
boundaries is problematic because of spatial variation in both malaria endemicity 
(which affects adult immunity to malaria) and cultural norms.  Using an experimental 
approach, it is possible to randomize the mode of distribution within one locality and 
thus to cleanly identify the effect of the distribution policy.   
I conducted a field experiment in an area of seasonal malaria transmission in 
western Uganda.  Parents or guardians of young children were randomly assigned to 
receive either cash or ITNs, and then had the opportunity to trade the ITNs for cash or 
vice versa.  Usage of nets was observed during nighttime checks three weeks later.  
Almost all (97 percent) of the individuals who acquired one or more nets were 
sleeping under a net, as were 93 percent of those who shared a sleeping place with this 
person.  Nets that had been received in kind were more likely to be used by young 
children in accordance with information given to all participants that children are more 
vulnerable to malaria.  Purchased nets were more likely to be used by those household 
members perceived to experience at least one malaria episode each year.  Educational 
attainment of the participant had no effect on child usage, however the husbands 
education was associated with childrens usage when a married woman received or 
purchased nets.  This suggests that women may not be able to implement health 
  63
related knowledge without the agreement of their husbands, and that men should be 
included in education efforts to promote child health.  
In the following section I review the literature on the household economics of 
malaria.  Findings from the behavioral economics and intrahousehold decision-making 
literatures raise issues which may underlie differences in the usage of free and 
purchased nets, and in the usage of nets acquired by men and women, are summarized 
in Section 3.  Section 4 discusses the conceptual framework.  I describe the setting and 
baseline data collection in Section 5.  Section 6 presents the experimental design and 
Section 7 describes results.  Discussion and concluding remarks follow in the final two 
sections. 
 
2. Household economics of malaria 
Malaria is caused by a parasite that requires both human and mosquito hosts to 
complete its life cycle.  If not treated properly, malaria parasites can remain in the 
human body long after symptoms subside, causing repeated episodes of illness.  With 
treatment and avoidance of re-exposure, malaria can be cleared from the system 
completely.  In East Africa, the most common species of malaria-transmitting 
mosquito bites primarily late at night, so that sleeping under a mesh mosquito net is a 
highly effective means of avoiding infection.   
While adults in malarious regions have typically acquired some immunity to 
the disease through repeated exposure over the course of their lives, they may still 
suffer symptoms and even death due to malaria.  Adults symptoms are more serious 
in regions where malaria transmission is seasonal, since immunity diminishes after 
several months without an infective bite.  However the risk of severe malaria resulting 
in lifelong disability or death is highest for young children and pregnant women across 
transmission environments (Snow et al. 2003, pp. 11-12).  On the other hand, lost 
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labor time often accounts for the largest portion of the private cost of the disease 
(Cropper et al. 2004).  This implies a tradeoff between minimizing the income lost to 
malaria and minimizing the risk that a household member dies or is permanently 
disabled, particularly in areas of lower transmission intensity.   
Lack of knowledge about the particular vulnerability of young children and 
pregnant women, as well as non-unitary preferences within the household, imply that 
an observed allocation of mosquito nets may not maximize household welfare.  
Determining the welfare-maximizing allocation of nets is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  Rather, I take as given the stated public health priority of covering young 
children and compare the effects of two net distribution policies on this outcome. 
Studies of particular programs in which nets were given for free to expectant 
mothers suggest that this is an effective way of targeting nets to infants.  Guyatt and 
Ochola (2003) and Dupas (2005) both found that 85 percent of nets given to pregnant 
women were used by their intended recipients.  Guyatt and Ochola, studying two 
districts in Kenya, noted a lower rate of net use among newborns in the district with 
lower malaria transmission intensity (80 vs. 91%), where adults tend to suffer more 
serious symptoms. 
In contrast, studies using a broader sample of households, among which many 
nets are likely to have been purchased through market channels, give inconsistent 
results on childrens net use.  Using data from the 2000-2001 Demographic and Health 
Survey (DHS) in Uganda, where there had been no widespread distribution of free 
nets, Mugisha and Arinaitwe (2003) showed that the coverage of young children in 
that country was largely incidental to sharing a bed with an adult: children who slept 
in the same bed as an adult were 22 times more likely to be sleeping under a net than 
other children.  A cross-country study using DHS data from 12 African countries 
revealed that children were no more or less likely than adults to use nets (Korenromp 
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et al. 2003).  However more recent work conducted in five African countries after 
widespread free distribution of nets found that young children were prioritized for net 
use (Baume et al 2005).   
Most of the above studies relied on questions about who slept under a net the 
previous night.  To the degree that respondents believe survey staff have preferences 
about the allocation of nets, these recall responses may be biased.  The only exception 
is a study by Alaii et al. (2003), who physically checked net usage during the night.  
This study also represents the only investigation of why young children do not use 
nets.  Even though all study participants were given enough nets for their entire 
household, under-fives were 14 percent less likely to use a net than others.  In this 
setting of year-round high transmission intensity (and resulting relatively strong 
immunity outside early childhood), primary reasons reported for lack of net use by 
under-fives were temperature and the disruption of usual sleeping arrangements.  The 
present research was conducted in an area of low transmission intensity, where adults 
typically suffer the symptoms of malaria if infected and economic factors may 
therefore play a stronger role in the intrahousehold allocation decision. 
 
3. Household and individual decision-making 
The most basic microeconomic model assumes that the household behaves as a 
unitary decision-maker and pools income from all sources to maximize a single utility 
function.  According to this model, the intrahousehold allocation of a good will not 
depend on who within the household acquires it, nor will the way in which a good is 
obtained determine its use.  However, empirical studies of intrahousehold allocation 
routinely reject the unitary household model.  Further, the behavioral economics 
literature documents systematic ways in which the assumption of income pooling is 
violated at the level of the individual.   
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Psychological effects 
That income has limited fungibility runs counter to standard theory but is well 
established empirically (Thaler 1990).  People tend to organize financial transactions 
into separate mental accounts linked to different needs, so that how money is spent 
depends on how it was acquired.  For example, child tax benefits increase 
expenditures on childrens clothing even though there are no rules about how these 
transfers should be spent (Kooreman 2000).  In a rural African setting, Duflo and Udry 
(2004) showed that income derived from certain crops was associated with 
expenditures on childrens education and food while the income from other crops was 
associated with private and adult goods, even when the two income streams were 
under the control of the same individual.   
In the rural Ugandan villages where I conducted the present study, purchased 
items may be associated with adult use whereas children are more likely to use goods 
received for free or handed down from adults.  Indeed, the average household in the 
sample spent less than a dollar on childrens clothes and shoes over the past year 
compared with over $18 on adult clothing and footwear. 
Another finding from behavioral economics is that utility is reference 
dependent and that losses relative to a reference point loom larger than gains.  Tversky 
and Kahneman (1991) developed the theory of loss aversion to explain their 
experimental finding that people charge more to sell a good than they are willing to 
pay to acquire the same good, a phenomenon known as the endowment effect.  Loss 
aversion has been shown to differ across both gender and goods, being more common 
among women than men (Brooks and Zank 2006) and stronger for goods with a public 
good component or moral attribute (Boyce et al. 1992, Irwin 1994).   
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Boyce et al. (1992) ran an experiment in which subjects were assigned the 
opportunity to either buy or sell a houseplant in a kill or a not-kill treatment.  Buyers 
(sellers) were asked to state their maximum willingness to pay (minimum willingness 
to accept cash) for a plant.  In the kill treatments, all plants left over after bidding 
(buying treatment) or sold back to experimenters (selling treatment) were killed.  In 
the not-kill treatments, no plants were killed.  Selling offers in the kill treatment were 
much higher than in the not kill treatment, but bids to buy plants were only slightly 
higher in the not kill treatment, suggesting that the responsibility for the life of the 
plants was more keenly felt when participants owned the plants.   
Irwin (1994) elicited subjects hypothetical willingness to pay and willingness 
to accept payment for changes in environmental states and private goods, as well as 
their rankings of the goods in terms of public benefit and moral value, and verbal 
accounts of the decision-making process.  She concluded that moral and public good 
attributes were more salient in the decision to accept payment, whereas personal gain 
was the main consideration when deciding whether to pay for something. 
One possible explanation for the greater salience of public good attributes in 
selling modes is guilt aversion, the idea that agents experience guilt if they believe 
they let others down (Charness and Dufwenberg 2006).  Charness and Dufwenbergs 
formulation of guilt aversion requires a second party who is materially affected by an 
agents actions, and has expectations concerning those actions.  However the Boyce et 
al. and Irwin experiments suggest that a desire to act morally may also influence 
decisions in the absence of such a second party, and that perceptions of moral 
obligation are highly sensitive to framing.  If a mother receives a free mosquito net in 
conjunction with a message that sleeping under that net can save the life of her child, 
she may perceive that using the net for her child is the right thing to do.  Selling the 
net, or using it for a different member of the household, would trigger feelings of guilt.  
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Receiving the same information along with the resources to purchase a net may not 
trigger the same perception of obligation to buy the net and use it for the child. 
 
Gender accounts 
Many programs aim to improve child health outcomes by targeting resources 
to women, based on the assumptions that mothers have particularly strong preferences 
for their childrens health, and that they are able to exert control over income they 
receive.  Indeed, stated preferences have been shown to differ systematically by 
gender (Kusago and Barham 2001), and the share of income earned by women is 
positively associated with expenditures on child health across a wide range of settings 
(Thomas 1990, Bourguignon et al. 1993, Browning et al. 1994, Hoddinott and Haddad 
1995, Phipps and Burton 1998, Duflo 2003).  These empirical results reject the unitary 
model of the household in favor of a bargaining model in which each adult member 
maximizes his or her individual utility function.  In such models, the intrahousehold 
allocation of goods depends upon the resources controlled by and outside options 
available to the various household decision-makers (Manser and Brown 1980, 
McElroy and Horney 1981, Ulph 1988, Lundberg and Pollak 1993). 
The empirical studies cited above do not generally control for how income is 
derived.16  In general, if income streams associated with child consumption (for 
example, gifts or government child subsidies) are primarily received by women, such 
analyses may overstate the impact of gender-specific preferences.  Thomas (1990) 
showed that unearned income under the mothers control has a greater effect on child 
survival than does fathers income, but noted that the composition of unearned income 
differs markedly by gender, with women deriving a larger share from pensions and 
                                                
16 Duflos (2003) paper showing that the gender of old-age pensioners in South Africa affects 
child health is a notable exception. 
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social security relative to men, who earn a greater portion from financial and physical 
assets.  Hoddinott and Haddads (1995) analysis relied on attributing certain crops to 
male and female control, leaving open the possibility that income from particular 
crops (perhaps those usually under female control) is associated with public goods 
expenditures as found by Duflo and Udry (2004).   
Using an experimental approach, it is possible to empirically distinguish the 
effect of gender and the psychological effect of the form in which income is received.  
Doing so in this paper, I find that giving mosquito nets in kind rather than selling them 
has a significant effect on child usage, whereas targeting transfers of nets or cash to a 
female rather than a male guardian does not.  The latter result suggests that either 
womens and mens preferences for child usage of nets do not differ significantly, or 
that the transfer of a net or cash does not change the bargaining power within the 
household.  
 
4. Conceptual framework 
Whether a child sleeps under a mosquito net requires first that one or more nets 
are acquired by the household and second that the child is given one of these to use.  
Denote the probability of purchasing n nets as ( )pZXWbuy hiin ,,, , and the conditional 
probability of a child sleeping under one of these as ( )nhi buyZXncu |,, .  Suppose one 
of the childs guardians, denoted i, has an opportunity to purchase between 0 and N 
nets, where N is the number of nets required to cover all household members, at a 
price of p per net.  The overall probability of a child using a net can be written as: 
 
( ) ( )nhi
N
hiin
i
b buyZXncupZXWbuyCU |,,,,,
0
⋅=∑ .                             (1) 
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In this formulation, the decision to purchase a given number of nets depends 
upon is cash on hand Wi, individual and household attributes Xi and Zh, respectively, 
and the price p.  The probability of the child using a net given that n nets have been 
purchased depends upon n as well as on the characteristics of the guardian who 
purchased the nets and of the household.  The probability of a child gaining access to a 
net when guardian i receives a transfer of iN  nets can similarly be written as: 
 
( ) ( )nhiN hiinif retainZXncupZXNretainCU |,,,,,
0
⋅=∑ ,                                 (2) 
 
where retainn is the probability that n of the nets that have been received are retained 
by the household.  Retention depends upon how many nets were received, the resale 
price p  that can be obtained for the nets, and the guardians individual and household 
attributes.  The endowment effect implies that nbuy and retainn may differ for given 
values of their arguments.  Recent work on the use of a home chlorination treatment 
for drinking water finds weak evidence that the act of paying positively influences 
usage, but no evidence that that the price paid has any effect (Ashraf et al. 2007).  
Allowing cu to depend on whether nets were retained or purchased explicitly allows 
for the possibility that paying affects the usage of nets.   
In a separate paper, coauthors and I use data from the experiment described 
here to show that, due to both liquidity and endowment effects, households are 
unlikely to purchase nets out of their own resources, and yet are unlikely to sell nets 
received for free (Hoffmann et al. 2007).  The present paper focuses on usage of nets 
by young children under these two distribution mechanisms and in particular on the 
difference between ( )nhi retainZXncu |,,  and ( )nhi buyZXncu |,, .  I also investigate 
whether the probability of a child using a net depends on the gender of the household 
member who acquired it. 
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5. Setting and baseline data collection 
At the time data were collected in October and November of 2006 there had 
been no large-scale distribution of free or subsidized ITNs in Uganda.  Conventional 
nets were available in weekly rural markets at a price of approximately $2.72 US, and 
higher-quality nets bundled with insecticide treatment kits were available in Mbarara, 
the nearest urban center, for twice this price.17  The long-lasting insecticidal nets 
(LLINs) offered through the experiment described here were not commercially 
available in Uganda.  These LLINs are much more durable than other nets, with an 
estimated 5-year lifespan compared to about one year for the highest quality 
conventional ITNs.  LLINs do not need to be annually retreated with insecticide as do 
conventional ITNs and are recommended by both the World Health Organization and 
the Ugandan Ministry of Health. 
Mbarara District was chosen for its seasonal transmission pattern of malaria 
and resultant low adult immunity, allowing identification of the income versus child 
health tradeoff.  To ensure ease of tracking project nets, the sub-county with the 
lowest baseline net ownership per capita was chosen.18  The experiment was 
conducted in Rubagano and Kimuli, villages 10 kilometers apart with populations of 
approximately 1300 and 900, respectively. 
Households with children aged up to five years or a pregnant woman were 
eligible to participate in the study.  A list of all households in each village meeting 
eligibility criteria was provided by the village chairmen.  In order to separately 
identify the effects of gender-specific preferences and control over income, 
households were stratified by the marital status of the head.  All 41 of the single-
                                                
17 Return transportation to Mbarara cost US $7.63. 
18 The number of nets per capita treated with insecticide in the governments 2005 retreatment 
campaign (according to district health center records) was used as a proxy for per capita net ownership. 
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headed households identified, 38 of which were headed by women, were selected for 
inclusion in the sample.  An additional 102 of the eligible dual-headed households 
were randomly selected.  Respondents were not necessarily parents of the children 
under their care: 12 percent of the households interviewed contained at least one child 
aged five years or younger who was neither the son nor daughter of the head or 
spouse.  All of these children were however relatives of the respondent. 
A questionnaire covering demographic information, malaria history and 
income-generating activities of each member of the family as well as household 
consumption expenditures was administered during an initial household visit.  
Respondents were asked to recall food consumption over the past week, non-durables 
and services purchased over the past month, and less frequent but regular expenditures 
such as educational expenses and purchases of clothing and household items over the 
past year.   
Average consumption value per capita among the sample was US $0.65 per 
day, excluding expenditures on health care.  While values are not strictly comparable 
because of differences in data collection methods, this is close to the US $0.59 daily 
per capita private consumption expenditure reported by the World Bank for Uganda in 
2005.  Almost all households in the sample derived at least some of their living from 
farming, and home produced goods accounted for 43 percent of total consumption 
value on average. 
Respondents were asked to state the hours worked by each member of the 
household on own farm, livestock, non-farm enterprises during the past week, how 
much it would cost to pay someone to do this work, and who in the household 
primarily controlled the income derived through this activity.  The median reported 
hourly value for each activity was calculated and this activity-specific wage was 
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multiplied by the number of hours worked.19  Reported earnings from paid jobs during 
the past week were added to calculate individual incomes. 
Respondents reported significant expenditures as a result of malaria: the mean 
and median costs incurred as a result of the most recent malaria episode, including 
transport, consultation fees and drugs, were $13.55 and $5.45, respectively. Eighty-
seven percent of individuals in the sample were reported to suffer from malaria at least 
once each year, and 79 percent of respondents claimed to know someone who had died 
of the disease.  Admissions data obtained from the sub-county local health clinic 
showed that over the past year, 40 percent of visits by children younger than 5 years 
and 54 percent of visits by older patients were malaria-related.  Only six of the 143 
households interviewed owned any mosquito nets at the time of the initial household 
visit.  Of the 15 individuals in these households using nets, three were five years or 
younger, and all three were sharing the net with at least one adult.  
 
6. Experimental design 
Treatment assignment 
Either the husband or wife in each of the dual-headed households was 
randomly selected to represent the household in one of fourteen bidding sessions held 
over five days beginning one week after the last household interview.  Approximately 
half of the participants in each category (married men, married women and single 
heads) were randomly assigned to receive a cash transfer, the other half to receive 
mosquito nets.  Bidding sessions were held separately for the two treatments, with 
seven sessions for each. 
                                                
19 Wages for men and women did not differ significantly so a single wage was calculated for each 
activity. 
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Table 3.1a shows the number of participants in each treatment by headship and 
gender.    Participants who missed their assigned session were allowed to attend a later 
session.  An effort was made to reassign the participants to a session of the same 
treatment, however this was not always possible.  Staff and participants were unaware 
until a session began whether it would be an in-kind or cash transfer session.  The 
reassignment of individuals between treatments is therefore unlikely to have 
introduced bias. 
A number of households sent a representative other than the one randomly 
assigned.  This person was asked to return home and send the assigned participant.  If 
the representative insisted that the assigned participant was absent and would not be 
able to attend an alternative session, other community members were asked to verify 
this.  In several instances, others contradicted the claim of the household 
representative and the intended respondent was eventually found.  However for 9 of 
the 143 participating households, a non-randomly assigned individual participated.  I 
retain these households in the analysis presented.  The results are robust to their 
exclusion as well as to using an intent-to-treat approach in which assigned rather than 
actual gender is used. 
Eleven households containing no children aged five years or younger were 
dropped from the analysis.  Two of these had been included in the initial sample 
because they contained a woman who was or might soon become pregnant.  Although 
an effort was made to replace households not meeting the eligibility criteria, lack of 
eligibility was not always discovered before the interview was initiated, resulting in 
the inclusion of nine ineligible households in the initial sample.  As shown in Table 
3.1c, the vast majority of these were single headed households.  An additional 
household whose members could not be located for a follow-up visit to observe net 
usage is also excluded from the analysis. 
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Table 3.1a: Sample by headship, assigned treatment, and gender of assigned 
participant       
  Received nets 
Received 
cash Total 
Male 25 25 50 Dual headed 
Female 25 27 52 
Male 1 2 3 Single headed 
Female 20 18 38 
Total  71 72 143 
 
Table 3.1b: Dual-headed households sending non-assigned participant, by 
assigned treatment and gender of assigned participant 
  Received nets 
Received 
cash Total 
Male 3 2 5 Dual headed 
Female 2 2 4 
Total  5 4 9 
 
Table 3.1c: Households with no children under 5 years, by headship, assigned 
treatment, and gender of assigned participant 
  Received nets 
Received 
cash Total 
Male 0 1 1 Dual headed 
Female 1 1 2 
Male 0 0 0 Single headed 
Female 2 6 8 
Total  3 8 11 
 
Table 3.1d: Households absent during monitoring of net usage. 
  Received nets 
Received 
cash Total 
Male 1 0 1 Dual headed 
Female 0 0 0 
Male 0 0 0 Single headed 
Female 0 0 0 
Total  1 0 1 
 
Table 3.1e: Final sample by actual treatment, headship and gender. 
  Received nets 
Received 
cash Total 
Male 24 24 49 Dual headed 
Female 27 23 50 
Male 1 2 3 Single headed 
Female 18 12 30 
Total  70 61 131 
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Balance across treatments 
Randomization implies that the characteristics of participating households are 
uncorrelated with the treatment in expectation.  To test whether randomization was in 
fact successful, I compare the means of observed household and participant 
characteristics across treatments and gender categories in Table 3.2.  Indeed, 
randomization on observables was successful, with none of these variables differing at 
the 10 percent level of significance.   
The gender and headship categories reveal differences between men and 
married women, and between single and married women.  The share of income 
controlled by men is significantly higher than that controlled by married women 
(p<0.01).  Single women likewise control a greater proportion of household income 
than married women (p<001).  Single female heads are significantly older and less 
educated than married women, and the demographic composition of single-headed 
households differs markedly from that of dual-headed households.  Single headed 
households have fewer members overall, with fewer young children and adults aged 
15 to 59, and a greater number of elderly members.  Many of the children cared for by 
single female heads are grandchildren or other relatives.  Notably, respondents 
perceived children aged 5 years and younger to suffer from malaria less frequently 
than adults (p<0.1). 
Experimental procedure 
Households in the free nets treatment were assigned a transfer of one, two or 
three 190 by 180 centimeter Olyset brand nets.  Those in the cash treatment received a 
transfer of the maximum possible price of one, two or three nets.20  The transfer of 
nets or cash was intended to be sufficient to acquire nets for all household members.   
                                                
20 Olyset nets are recommended by the World Health Organization and the Ugandan Ministry of Health.  
$7.63 US (14,000 Ugandan Shillings) is the approximate wholesale price of these nets in Kenya (they 
are not commercially available in Uganda); the manufacturing cost is approximately $5 US.   
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Table 3.2: Means of household and respondent characteristics, by treatment, 
gender and headship 
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 Treatment Respondent gender and headship 
 
Received 
nets 
Receive
d cash Male 
Female 
married 
Female 
single 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Free nets treatment 1.00 0.00 0.48 0.55 0.60 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
Female participant 0.64 0.57 0.00*** 1.00 1.00* 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Single headed household 0.27 0.23 0.06* 0.00* 1.00 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) 
4.85 4.88 4.82 4.81 5.04 Expenditures per capita 
(USD/week) (0.36) (0.36) (0.38) (0.48) (0.40) 
0.40 0.36 0.39*** 0.26 0.58*** 
Share of household 
income under 
respondent's control (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) 
Age of household head 38.64 41.41 37.94 35.51 51.17*** 
 (1.64) (2.04) (2.00) (1.48) (3.12) 
3.73 4.23 5.04 4.73 0.87*** Years education of male 
or single female head (0.44) (0.48) (0.48) (0.56) (0.27) 
2.81 2.87 2.97 2.71 . Years education of 
spouse (0.48) (0.46) (0.43) (0.50) (.) 
0.81 0.86 0.87 0.78 0.87 
Proportion of household 
children 5 years or 
younger who suffer 
from malaria every year (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) 
0.89 0.94 0.92 0.88 0.94 
Proportion of household 
members aged 15-59 
who suffer from 
malaria every year (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
9.75 6.62 8.22 9.17 7.00 
HH average expenditure 
on last malaria episode 
of child 5 or younger 
(USD) (1.54) (1.44) (1.27) (2.06) (2.32) 
17.07 15.71 18.12 14.33 17.23 
HH average expenditure 
on last malaria episode 
of member  ≥ 6 years 
(USD) (2.26) (2.07) (2.43) (1.93) (4.34) 
2.20 1.95 2.26 2.18 1.60*** # of members aged 0-5 
yrs (0.13) (0.10) (0.16) (0.12) (0.15) 
# of members aged 0-5 
yrs who are not children 
of the participant 0.19 0.18 0.10 0.02 0.60*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.15) 
# of members aged 6-14 
yrs 1.70 1.74 1.70 1.76 1.67 
 (0.17) (0.18) (0.19) (0.22) (0.23) 
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Table 3.2 (Continued) 
 Treatment Respondent gender and headship 
 
Received 
nets 
Received  
cash Male 
Female 
married Female single 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
# of members aged 15-59 
yrs 2.11 2.13 2.44 2.27 1.33*** 
 (0.12) (0.16) (0.17) (0.11) (0.20) 
# of members aged 60+ yrs 0.10 0.21 0.12 0.08 0.33*** 
 (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) 
Household size 6.11 6.00 6.50 6.29 4.93*** 
 (0.26) (0.26) (0.29) (0.31) (0.32) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. Tests of equality are between treatments (significance shown in 
column 1), between married men and women (significance shown in column 3), and between dual-
headed and single-headed households (significance shown in column 5) * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
In calculating how many nets or how much cash to give to a family, I assumed that 
individuals already sleeping in the same bed would share a net.  I also assumed that 
separate beds could be moved together in order to share nets if necessary.  According 
to this logic, each household received nets or the cash equivalent equal to the 
minimum of the following: the number of distinct sleeping sites in the dwelling, the 
number of household members divided by two and rounded up to the next integer, and 
three.  The maximum of three nets was due to a project budget constraint.  Since nets 
were large enough to cover up to four children, even the largest households in the 
sample, which contained eleven members, would be able to cover all of their 
members.  Separate sessions were held for households receiving one net, two nets, and 
three nets, and for those receiving a cash transfer of $7.63 (the maximum possible 
price of one net), $15.26, and $22.89. 
At the beginning of each session, participants were given their transfer of nets 
or cash, according to the treatment.  They were told that this gift of nets or cash was 
compensation for participation in the study, and that they could exchange or keep and 
use this compensation as they wished.  Participants in all sessions were read the same 
statement about malaria.  This included the following passage about the particular 
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vulnerability of pregnant women and children (see the Appendix to Chapter 2 for the 
full script): 
 
Malaria is more likely to be serious for young children and pregnant 
women. In Uganda malaria is the number one killer of children under 5 
years, and is responsible for 6 of every 10 miscarriages.  Grown men 
and women who are not pregnant may also become sick with malaria 
and may die, but they are less likely to die of malaria than young 
children and pregnant women.  Severe malaria can also cause mental 
retardation, blindness, and deafness in children.21 
 
Staff demonstrated how to hang a mosquito net and tuck it under the corners of 
the bed or sleeping mat.  A villager who had received six of the same brand of LLIN 
through a UN project several months earlier told the group that these nets killed 
mosquitoes and had prevented malaria in her family during the time they had used 
them.   
Participants then had the opportunity to exchange nets for cash or cash for nets 
using the Becker-deGroot-Marschak mechanism (Becker et al. 1964).  This 
mechanism is commonly used in experimental economics because it is preference-
revealing.  The basic mechanism works as follows.  Participants enter bids before the 
price of a good is revealed.  The price is then randomly drawn from a distribution of 
possible prices.  Participants in a buying treatment who bid at or above this randomly 
drawn price purchase the good at the drawn price and keep the remainder of any cash 
transfer they have received.  Those who bid below the price do not purchase the good, 
keeping instead the entire cash transfer.  The mechanism works because it is in the 
best interest of participants to bid according to their actual valuation of the good on 
offer.  Those who bid less than their true value risk not buying the good when the 
price is low enough that they would in fact prefer to buy.  Conversely, bidding above 
                                                
21 Information adapted from the Uganda Ministry of Health (2006). 
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ones true value risks buying when the price is higher than one would actually be 
willing to pay. 
Before bidding for mosquito nets, three non-confidential practice rounds were 
conducted in which food items and pencils were exchanged for cash.  In the free net 
sessions, participants were given food and pencils which they could keep or sell.  In 
the cash transfer sessions participants were given cash which they could keep or use to 
purchase these goods.  For each practice round, as well as the final ITN round, bidding 
proceeded as follows.  One of the experimenters explained the bidding procedure, and 
for each item, told participants the possible prices that could be drawn as he placed 
one ping-pong ball representing each of these possible prices in a bucket.  For all 
sessions, the possible prices were uniformly distributed from $0.54 to $7.63 in 
increments of $0.54. Participants were given tokens representing currency, which they 
placed in envelopes to indicate their buying bids or selling offers.  Those who had 
received cash indicated the maximum they were willing to pay and those who had 
received nets, the minimum they were willing to accept, for three items (in the three 
net sessions), two items (in the three net and two net sessions), and one item (in all the 
sessions).  By requiring separate bids for the first, second and third nets, the marginal 
willingness to pay for each net was observed.  Staff were available to assist with bids 
if needed, but participants were asked to keep their net bids as confidential as possible. 
After all bids had been recorded (and in the practice rounds displayed), one of 
the participants drew a ball to select the price.  In cash transfer sessions, participants 
who had bid at least as much as the drawn price for a given number of goods 
exchanged cash for that number of goods.  For example, in a cash transfer session 
where the price drawn was p, if a participant bid at least 3p for three nets, he would 
buy all three nets at the total price of 3p.  If he bid less than 3p for three nets but at 
least 2p for two nets, he would buy two nets for 2p, and if he bid less than 2p for two 
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but more than p for one, he would buy one net at price p.  Finally, if he bid less than 
3p, less than 2p, and less than p for three, two and one net, respectively, he would 
keep all the cash and receive no nets.  Transactions for the in-kind transfer sessions 
followed the same logic, with participants selling back the nets they had been given at 
the randomly drawn price.22  The number of nets offered, number of participants, and 
price realizations for each session in the in-kind and cash transfer treatments are 
reported in Tables 3.3a and 3.3b. 
 
Table 3.3a: Number of participants, nets, and randomly drawn price, free net 
sessions. 
Chronological 
session number  2 4 5 8 9 11 13 Mean 
Number of nets or 
equivalent cash 
transfer 
1 3 2 3 2 3 3 2.42 
Number of 
participants in 
final sample 
3 9 13 9 11 13 12 10  
Randomly drawn 
price 2.72 5.46 1.09 6.54 4.35 4.90 5.44 4.35 
 
Table 3.3b: Number of participants, nets, and randomly drawn price, cash 
transfer sessions. 
Chronological 
session number 1 3 6 7 10 12 14 Mean 
Number of nets or 
equivalent cash 
transfer 
1 2 3 3 3 3 3 2.57 
Number of 
participants in final 
sample 
3 10 7 8 12 10 11 8.71 
Randomly drawn 
price 
3.8
1 5.99 5.99 5.45 3.81 6.54 7.08 5.58 
 
                                                
22 Two participants desired to change their bids after the price for nets was drawn. They were allowed to 
do so and their bids were altered accordingly. 
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Before consenting to participate, all participants were told that if they 
purchased or retained any nets, survey staff or village leaders would visit them at night 
to see how these were being used.  Participants could request that either a fellow 
community member or member of the survey staff would perform this task.  They 
were not informed of the date on which this the visit would occur.  Home visits by 
community leaders were conducted between 9 pm and midnight on one night per 
village, three weeks after the bidding sessions.  A few days later, again on a single 
night per village, survey staff visited the homes of those who had requested that an 
outsider conduct the net use check.  During these visits, the net usage of each 
household member was recorded.   
 
7. Results 
Net purchase and retention 
As respondents willingness to pay for and sell nets received in kind is the 
subject of a separate paper (Hoffmann et al. 2007), the following discussion concerns 
primarily the intrahousehold allocation of nets.  However, a brief summary of the bids 
and resulting distribution of nets across treatment groups is in order.  Consistent with 
the endowment effect, those in the free nets treatment entered bids higher by $1.22 on 
average than those in the cash transfer treatment, resulting in a greater average number 
of nets per capita owned in the in-kind group (Table 3.4).  Most of this difference is 
accounted for by those households in the cash group that did not buy any nets; 
conditional on acquiring at least one net, the number of nets per capita is almost 
equaland not statistically significantly differentacross treatments, at 0.40 and 0.42 
among the cash and net transfer groups, respectively.  Some nets of the nets acquired 
through the experiment were observed but had not been hung at the time of the follow-
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up visit.  Among the free nets group, 10 percent were not using at least one of the nets 
they had received; 13.5 percent of the cash transfer group had at least one unused net. 
 
Table 3.4: Bids, net purchases or retention, and usage by treatment 
 Received nets Received cash 
Average buying bid or selling offer (up to 3 nets) $7.16 $5.94*** 
Proportion  keeping or buying at least one net 0.99 0.85*** 
Nets obtained per capita 0.42 0.33*** 
Nets  per capita, conditional on acquiring at least one net 0.42 0.40 
Number of unused nets 0.19 0.14 
Proportion with at least one net unused 0.10 0.14 
* Difference in means is significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Individual usage 
Looking first at the usage rates across age and gender categories (Table 3.5), the 
elderly, women of child-bearing age, and other adults are the most frequent users of 
nets.23  Children five years and younger follow, with older children the least likely to 
be covered.  Usage is slightly higher overall among the group that received nets,  
 
 
Table 3.5: Proportion using net, by age and gender category.   
 Whole sample* Obtained at least one net 
 Pooled 
sample 
Received 
cash 
Received 
nets 
Pooled 
sample 
Received 
cash 
Received 
nets 
Age 0-5 0.69 0.56 0.79 0.76 0.69 0.80 
Age 6-14 0.64 0.59 0.68 0.67 0.66 0.68 
Female 15-
45 0.85 0.79 0.91 0.92 0.91 0.92 
Other adults 0.84 0.80 0.87 0.89 0.90 0.88 
Age 60+ 0.89 0.82 1.00 0.94 0.90 1.00 
Total 0.73 0.65 0.79 0.78 0.76 0.80 
*Assumes no change from baseline net usage in households that did not acquire any nets through the 
experiment.  
 
                                                
23 I do not test for significance of differences among proportions because individual outcomes are 
correlated within households. 
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even conditional on having acquired at least one net.  The only group for which this is 
not the case is adults other than women aged 15 to 45, who have lower mean usage in 
the free nets group than the cash transfer group, conditional on acquiring at least one 
net.  Pregnant women and young children are the demographic group most vulnerable 
to severe malaria.  Pregnancy is not reliably observed, and women of childbearing age 
are also income earners and often share a sleeping place with the household head, and 
so could be using nets for multiple reasons.  In what follows I focus on the net usage 
of children aged five years and younger in order to more easily identify what leads 
households to protect those most at risk. 
Table 3.6 presents results from a linear regression model in which the 
dependent variable is the household-level proportion of children aged five years and 
younger using nets in the free nets and cash transfer groups.24  Households that did not 
acquire any nets through the experiment are assumed not to have changed their usage 
since the baseline survey.  As described in Section 4, net allocation depends on two 
separate but related decisions.  Participants decide both how many nets to purchase or 
retain and how to allocate any nets among household members.  Both decisions clearly 
affect childrens usage.  The most basic and arguably most policy-relevant comparison 
across treatments does not separate the effect of these two decisions.  The first column 
in Table 3.6 shows that child coverage in the free nets treatment is 20.5% higher on 
average than in the cash transfer treatment, unconditional on the number of nets 
obtained.  This effect is significant at the one percent level, and is robust to including 
the number of children in the target age group and the educational attainment of the 
household head as controls (column 2). 
                                                
24 Qualitatively similar results obtain using a probit specification in which the dependent variable is 
equal to one if all children are using nets and zero otherwise. 
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             Mode of receipt remains a significant predictor of child usage when 
controlling for the number of nets acquired (columns 3 and 4).  However simply 
entering the number of nets on the right hand side is problematic since this also a 
choice variable and is clearly related to the decision of who will use the nets.  I 
therefore use the number nets given or offered for sale to the household as an 
instrument for the number of nets acquired.   
Recall that the number of nets or amount of cash given to a participant 
depended upon the number of people and distinct sleeping places in the participants 
household according to the formula min{round(household size/2), number of distinct 
sleeping places, 3}.  Due to the upper limit on the transfer and the discontinuous 
nature of this function, significant variation in the size of the transfer remains after 
controlling for household size, number of distinct sleeping places, and members per 
sleeping place, all of which may be directly correlated with childrens net usage.  
Thus, the stepwise form of the ITN transfer function is the source of exogenous 
variation I exploit to identify the effect of the first-stage decision of how many nets to 
purchase or retain.25  I use a limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) 
estimator due the superior small sample properties of this estimator compared with 
two-stage least squares (Anderson et al. 1982). 
                                                
25 A potential weakness of this identification strategy lies in the possibility that after controlling for 
household size, number of beds, and members per bed in a linear manner, correlation between the 
instrument and latent preference for child health (which may be reflected in household size and number 
of beds) remains.  To explore this concern I test a specification that includes squared terms of these 
control variables. This yields results identical to those presented (available from the author). 
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The excluded instrument is a highly significant predictor of nets acquired per 
member, with an F-statistic greater than 25 in both specifications.  Controlling for the 
number of nets acquired in this way, receiving nets in kind has an independent effect 
on childrens usage (columns 6 and 8).  Conditional on household size and number of 
distinct sleeping places, households with more young children tend to acquire fewer 
nets.  Education of the household head is positively associated with child net usage. 
Table 3.7 presents results related to the gender of the (cash or net) transfer 
recipient.  Only households headed by a married couple are included in this analysis.  
Across specifications, the gender of the net recipient has no effect on childrens usage.  
Educational attainment of the participant likewise has no effect.  However, for the sub-
sample of households for which the transfer recipient was a woman, the probability 
that all children will sleep under a net is affected by the education of the participants 
husband.  Spouses education has no effect on the usage of nets obtained by men.  
This suggests that married women may not have sufficient power within the household 
to implement health-related behaviors even when they are provided with external 
resources.  Educating fathers as well as mothers about child health may therefore be 
important.  
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Determinants of individual net usage 
Next I explore the determinants of net usage with a probit regression of 
individual net usage on individual characteristics and household controls.  The 
dependent variable is equal to one if the person was using a net at the time of the 
night-time visit and zero otherwise.  As above, individuals in households that did not 
purchase any nets are assumed not to have changed their ITN usage since the time of 
the baseline survey.   
Most households consist of a nuclear family in which a single guardian or 
couple cares for one or more children.  The share of total household labor income 
earned by those sharing a bed with the recipient of the cash or nets transfer is 75 
percent on average.  This makes it difficult to separately identify the effects of 
individual income, headship, and net receipt on usage.  I therefore control for these 
variables jointly with an indicator variable that is equal to one if the individual shares 
a sleeping place with the experimental participant.  In 54 percent of sample 
households, no young children were sharing the bed of the individual who received the 
net or cash transfer.  
The two other individual-level explanatory variables are indicators signifying 
whether the individual usually gets malaria every year according to the respondent 
in the baseline interview, and whether the individual is aged five years or younger and 
a child of the participant who received the transfer.  As in the household-level model, I 
use the number of nets offered as an instrument for the number of nets acquired, 
controlling for the household size, number of distinct sleeping places, and people per 
sleeping place.  Standard errors are clustered by household. 
The results, given in Table 3.8, show that the strongest predictor of using a net 
is sharing a sleeping place with the individual who acquired the nets.  Indeed, in all 
but four cases, those who had received or purchased nets were later found to be using 
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a net (in two of these households the nets were not being used by anyone).  When 
purchased with a cash transfer, nets were more likely to be used by those perceived to 
suffer from malaria most frequently, whereas young children were favored for use 
when nets were received in kind (column 2).  Recall from the discussion of baseline 
characteristics that adults are perceived as suffering from malaria more frequently than 
young children.   
Restricting the sample to dual-headed households, the way in which women 
and men allocate nets among household members does not differ significantly (column 
4).  This may be due to the fact that women do not control usage even when they are 
the ones to receive or purchase nets, as suggested by the effect of husbands education 
on the use of nets acquired by women.   
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Table 3.8: Probit model of individual net use (=1 if individual was sleeping under 
net at time of follow-up visit; 0 otherwise), instrumenting for the number of nets 
acquired, by treatment; standard errors clustered by household; estimated 
coefficients shown. Assumes no change from baseline net usage in households 
that did not acquire any nets through the experiment. 
 Effect of free receipt Effect of female recipient 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 nets acquired per member 
using net at 
time of visit 
nets acquired 
per member 
using net at 
time of visit 
Individual attributes     
shares bed with participant -0.001 0.263*** -0.012 0.257*** 
 (0.012) (0.043) (0.009) (0.045) 
child of participant ≤ 5 years old -0.034** 0.009 -0.023* -0.011 
 (0.015) (0.040) (0.013) (0.042) 
usually gets malaria each year -0.054** 0.116** -0.057** 0.198*** 
 (0.026) (0.058) (0.023) (0.067) 
Interactions     
free * shares bed with participant -0.001 -0.021   
 (0.015) (0.077)   
free * child of participant ≤ 5 years 
old 0.026 0.173**   
 (0.019) (0.075)   
free * usually gets malaria each year 0.018 -0.214**   
 (0.030) (0.107)   
female participant * shares bed with 
participant   0.009 -0.091 
   (0.016) (0.090) 
female participant * child of 
participant ≤ 5 years old   0.003 0.011 
   (0.018) (0.075) 
female participant * usually gets 
malaria each year   0.039 -0.078 
   (0.031) (0.125) 
Household controls     
participant received nets free 0.046* 0.073   
 (0.027) (0.063)   
participant is female   -0.020 0.149*** 
   (0.028) (0.061) 
household size -0.055*** 0.097** -0.049*** 0.131*** 
 (0.017) (0.048) (0.019) (0.048) 
members per bed -0.032 -0.274* -0.045 -0.423** 
 (0.063) (0.155) (0.062) (0.166) 
beds 0.015 -0.130* 0.009 -0.185*** 
 (0.026) (0.067) (0.026) (0.067) 
number of nets available 0.119***  0.111***  
 (0.026)  (0.032)  
number of nets per member  0.762  0.992 
  (0.645)  (0.742) 
Number of observations 757 598 
probability > Chi-squared 0.000 0.000 
Number of households 129 95 
Marginal effects.  Standard errors, clustered by household, in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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8. Discussion 
The results presented here show that the determinants of mosquito net usage 
are contingent on how nets are acquired.  Young children, whose vulnerability to 
malaria is highlighted in a message accompanying net distribution, are more likely to 
use nets received for free. 
The behavioral economics literature suggests several possible explanations for 
why nets received for free are more likely to be used for children.  The effect could be 
due to mental accounting, with free goods more closely associated with children and 
purchased goods associated with adults.  Alternatively, receiving enough nets for all 
family members may have led participants to perceive the status quo as all members 
using a net.  If those who received cash had a different perception of the status quo, 
and if child health is subject to greater loss aversion than adult health, this could 
explain the observed difference in usage across treatments.  Finally, if participants 
perceptions of the researchers beliefsor their own beliefsabout who should use 
the nets varied across treatments, guilt aversion could underlie the differences in net 
usage.  Even with identical verbal messages, the normative message implicit in giving 
a net versus giving cash could lead to such a difference in beliefs across treatments.  
This raises the question of whether knowledge of future monitoring affected usage 
differentially in the two groups.  Future research could avoid this possible Hawthorne 
effect by monitoring which individuals beds have nets hanging over them in an 
unannounced daytime follow-up visit. 
 
9. Conclusions 
The experiment described here suggests that distributing nets for free leads to a 
greater number of children covered than offering nets for sale, even when parents are 
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given adequate resources to purchase nets for the entire household.  This result is 
partially due to the endowment effect: the number of free nets retained is higher than 
the number of nets purchased with a cash transfer of equal value.  However, even 
controlling for the number of nets acquired, children are still more likely to use nets 
received for free.   
Almost universally, the person who received or purchased nets slept under a 
net.  More than half of the time, there were no children sharing a bed with this person.  
This finding lends support to calls for nets to be targeted more broadly than to the 
vulnerable groups of young children and pregnant women, since scarce nets appear to 
first be used by the household head (Teklehaimanot et al. 2007).   
Who else in the household used a net depended on how nets were acquired.  
When nets were purchased, those perceived to suffer from malaria on a regular basis 
were more likely than others to use them.  Nets received for free were more likely to 
be used by young children, in accordance with a message given to all participants 
about the particular vulnerability of this group.  This finding suggests that mode of 
distribution can be used to influence the intra-household allocation of a good.   
Giving or selling nets specifically to women, on the other hand, did not achieve 
higher child coverage.  Husbands education level was a significant determinant of 
child usage when nets were received by married women, suggesting that these women 
do not fully control resources they bring into the home. 
The health benefits of many goods, including mosquito nets, depend upon their 
allocation within the household.  It is broadly recognized that parents may have 
heterogeneous preferences and keep separate accounts.  The stylized fact that women 
value child health more than men is often used in the design of programs to promote 
child health.  Less well understood is the link between how a good is obtained and 
how it is used, though this area is drawing increasing attention.  The finding that the 
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intrahousehold allocation of a good can be affected by the way in which it is obtained 
has implications for the design of programs targeting particular groups at the sub-
household level.  Such targeting may be appropriate if the preferences of household 
decision-makers are at odds with social preferences, or if decision-makers misperceive 
the relative vulnerability of household members.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
FOOD AID AND AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION: EVIDENCE FROM 
MALAWI26,27 
 
Abstract:   
Food aid may influence farm households production decisions through several 
mechanisms.  The net impact of these effects is theoretically ambiguous.  We use 
nationally representative household survey and meteorological data from Malawi to 
analyze empirically the effect of receiving food aid on labor supply and input use.  
Using a lagged weather index as an instrument for food aid receipt, we find that 
households that received food aid allocated more labor time to own farm and non-farm 
enterprise activities, and less time to unskilled wage labor, and spent more on seeds.  
The results suggest that aid relaxes the immediate budget constraint, allowing 
households to allocate resources to activities that maximize income over a longer time 
horizon. 
 
1.  Introduction  
Food aid constitutes a significant share of total food availability in poor food 
deficit countries such as Malawi.  According to FAO statistics, food aid amounted to 
4.3% of national cereal production in Malawi over the period 2001-2004.  Concern is 
often raised by national policy makers as well as donors about the disincentive effects 
of free food distribution on agricultural production.28  To what extent such 
                                                
26 Authors, Vivian Hoffmann of Cornell University and Kathleen Beegle of The World Bank 
27 All views are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of the World Bank or its member 
countries. The authors can be contacted at veh4@cornell.edu or kbeegle@worldbank.org. 
28 See, for example, Peter Greste, Ethiopias food aid addiction, February 2, 2006, BBC online.  
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disincentive effects exist is an important question if, as examples in Harvey and Lind 
(2005) suggest, donors scale back relief entitlements to avoid dependency among 
recipients.  
While fears of aid dependency assume that the receipt of aid will cause 
households to scale back their production activities, the direction in which aid affects 
production is theoretically ambiguous.  Since leisure is a normal good, an increase in 
transfer income may lead to a decrease in total hours worked, with a resulting decline 
in production.  However aid may also be used to purchase additional farm inputs or re-
allocate time to own production activities with future payoffs rather than working for 
relatively low wages to cover immediate costs.  Further, income from aid may allow 
households to insure against future production risk through savings, facilitating the 
adoption of higher-risk livelihood strategies.  
In the long run, households that receive aid repeatedly may come to expect it in 
the future.  As with a one-time transfer, this may cause households to reallocate time 
from productive activities to leisure.  On the other hand, expected income from aid 
could be perceived as a safety net against downside production risk, again allowing 
households to engage in riskier livelihood strategies such as own farm production 
rather than wage labor.  This effect will be stronger the more responsive aid is to 
negative production shocks.   
Finally, food aid may influence production through agricultural output prices 
and its effect on the political economy of agricultural market reform and public 
investment in agriculture.  To the extent that food aid depresses agricultural output 
prices, this will adversely affect the welfare of net sellers, and in the long run create 
disincentives for production of the affected commodities.29 
                                                
29 The early empirical literature on this point, reviewed by Maxwell and Singer (1979), shows evidence 
of price effects in a minority of countries studied.  A more recent paper by Kirwan and McMillan 
(2007) finds no evidence of price effects in Ethiopia. 
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The focus of this paper is on the immediate effect of receiving food aid on 
household production behavior.  The existing empirical evidence on this question is 
slim and inconclusive; it is mostly based on case studies and descriptive statistics 
(Lappe and Collins, 1979; Stevens, 1979; Jackson and Eade, 1982; Maxwell et al, 
1994).  The only study we know of that uses econometric techniques is by Abdulai et 
al (2006), who use an Ethiopian dataset of 1,470 households. Controlling for other 
household characteristics and using lagged aid as an instrument for current aid, they 
find that receipt of food aid within the past year is not associated with a decrease in 
household labor supply, and that a positive labor supply effect may even be present. 
The current paper makes two main contributions.  First, we use a four year 
lagged weather index as an instrument for food aid receipt.  We prefer this instrument 
to lagged aid receipt, which is likely to be correlated with unobserved, time-invariant 
characteristics associated with chronic need.  Second, we use nationally representative 
data from Malawi.  Much of the existing literature on the microeconomic effects of 
food aid focuses on Ethiopia, where most food aid is given as payment for labor on 
community development projects (Jayne et al., 2002).  The vast majority of Malawis 
food aid, on the other hand, is distributed for free without any work requirement.  The 
effect on production behavior of receiving free food has not to our knowledge been 
studied in a developing country context. 
 
2.  Food Aid in Malawi  
Agriculture accounts for 39 percent of Malawis GDP and is almost 
exclusively the domain of smallholders (Øygard, 2005).  Maize is the dietary staple 
and accounts for up to 70 percent of calorie consumption.  According to the most 
recent national Integrated Household Survey (IHS2), 77 percent of cropped land is 
under maize.  The vast majority of agriculture in Malawi is rain-fed, meaning that 
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production is closely correlated with rainfall.  During the 2005 drought, maize 
production fell by 30 percent from its 2004 level.  In years of severe negative rainfall 
shocks, which have become increasingly common, cereal imports through both 
commercial and aid channels act as a partial buffer to the wide fluctuations in 
production (Figure 4.1). 
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Figure 4.1. Per capita cereals production, imports, and food aid receipts, 1970-
2003 
 
In recent years, the main food security programs in Malawi have been 
subsidized or free distribution of agricultural inputs and free distribution of food as 
drought relief.  Our study focuses on the receipt of food, and not the agricultural inputs 
program.  More than one-quarter of households in Malawi received some free food 
(usually maize) during 2001-2003. The vast majority of social protection transfers 
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were in the form of free food aid; including other social protection programs (food for 
work, direct cash transfers, and supplemental feeding) as well as free food aid, 30 
percent of households received some sort of ex-post transfer during these three years.  
Food aid is allocated primarily through the general distribution program supported by 
the World Food Program, which typically distributes 50 kilogram bags of maize to 
households monthly for some set number of months.  
Food aid can potentially affect decisions about income activities, including 
farming, in several ways.  The mechanism that receives perhaps the most attention is 
the classic moral hazard effect of food aid as an insurance contract.  From this 
perspective, the expectation that aid will compensate for inadequate agricultural output 
generated by the household may result in less household investment in production 
activities, including cutting back on both purchased inputs and labor. The more 
responsive aid is to income shortfalls, the more the household can expand its expected 
intertemporal budget set by investing less in production and relying instead on 
transfers.  This same mechanism may have a positive effect on production if higher-
risk activities have higher average returns.  When markets for insurance and credit are 
missing, the ability to smooth consumption over time is limited to self-insurance 
through savings.  As argued by Eswaran and Kotwal (1990), poorer households, who 
lack savings, will thus choose low-risk income-generating strategies in order to 
minimize their exposure to low income and consequent low consumption draws.  Aid 
that is targeted to provide insurance against income risk would increase the 
attractiveness of higher risk production technologies to households otherwise unable 
to insure.  To the extent that riskier technologies have higher expected returns than 
those with low risk, food aid would thus increase expected non-transfer income, 
particularly among the poor.  A growing empirical literature has documented income-
smoothing through the use of low-return, low-risk agricultural crop portfolios among 
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poorer households (Rosenzweig and Binswanger, 1993; Dercon, 1996).  As argued by 
Carter and Barrett (2006), such income-smoothing behavior creates a positive 
relationship between wealth and marginal returns that can trap a household in poverty.  
To the degree that food aid functions (and is perceived) as a reliable safety net, it 
could potentially serve as an avenue out of this stochastic poverty trap.   
The inconsistent and unpredictable nature of food in Malawi and elsewhere 
suggests that, for better or worse, few households are likely to rely on future aid when 
making production decisions.  Although evidence from Ethiopia shows inertia in food 
aid distribution at the regional level (Jayne et al., 2002), household-level analysis 
reveals that aid receipts are highly unpredictable (Lentz and Barrett, 2005; Little, 
2005).  A recent assessment of emergency free food distribution in Malawi (Sharma, 
2005) noted that while distribution guidelines specified that the poorest of the poor 
were to receive food, and recommended that households with certain characteristics be 
prioritized for assistance30, only one community focus group identified poverty as a 
targeting criterion, while 7 of the 42 believed that targeting was random.  Further, 
nearly a third of the households living in program areas were not aware that a food aid 
program was operating in their area.  This uncertainty about aid targeting criteria, and 
even ignorance of its availability, suggest that the moral hazard and insurance effects 
of aid as currently distributed are unlikely to affect behavior.   
Turning to the effects of received (rather than expected) aid, timing is critical.  
Due to the reliance of agriculture on rainfall, the demand for agricultural labor, in 
which 89 percent of the working population is engaged, is highly seasonal (Wodon 
                                                
30 These were child-, elderly-, and female-headed households, those with chronically ill or HIV/AIDS 
affected members, those having suffered two or more years of successive crop failures, and those 
currently receiving benefits under the Therapeutic Feeding Program.  
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and Beegle, 2006).  While there is some regional variation, agricultural labor demand 
peaks from November to January when the main crops are planted, weeded and 
fertilized (Figure 4.2).  The maize harvest occurs from March in the South to May in 
the North, and is followed by a period of relative slack.   
Consumption likewise varies with the agricultural year, with the lowest levels from 
December through February in the period immediately preceding the harvest.  Figure 
4.2 illustrates this variation using data from the Malawi Integrated Household Survey 
2.  The survey was conducted over the course of a year, with data on food 
expenditures collected using a week-long recall module.  We estimate the seasonal  
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IHS2. 
Figure 4.2. Seasonality of labor, food expenditures, and food aid disbursements 
 
 
variation in food expenditures by regressing real food expenditures on month of 
interview dummies and district fixed effects.  The coefficients on the month dummies 
planting hungry harvestplot preparation
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plotted in Figure 4.2 represent the average percentage deviation of weekly food 
expenditures from a February baseline, controlling for regional variation.   
In a 2003-2004 survey of 2030 households, 62.5 percent of households 
identified lack of inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides as the reason for not cultivating 
all of their land (Tango International, cited in ibid).  After inputs, labor was the second 
most important constraint, cited by 44.5 percent of respondents.  Previous work by 
Peters (1996) found that the poor work disproportionately more often on others farms 
during the food deficit, pre-harvest months, leaving less time to work on the home 
farm.   
Since food aid is distributed during this same period, we would expect that 
food aid might relax the labor constraint and, to the extent that the input constraint 
stems from lack of cash, the input constraint.  Using a linear programming model, 
Bezuneh et al. (1988) show that food for work program participants in rural Kenya 
have net returns 52 percent higher than non-participants due to such an effect.  The 
majority of food aid disbursed by the World Food Program in Malawi over the 2002-
2003 agricultural year was well-timed to alleviate both time and cash constraints 
(Figure 4.2).   
 
3.  Theoretical Framework 
A simple agricultural model serves to illustrate the microeconomic effects of 
aid transfers on agricultural production.  A representative household derives utility 
each period from consumption ct and leisure tl . The utility function is concave in both 
arguments, and strictly increasing in consumption, with infinite marginal utility at 
ct=0.  Utility is additively separable across seasons and years, and is discounted by a 
factor β < 1 across periods.  At the beginning of each period, the household chooses 
how much time to allocate to own production activities ,f tL , wage labor ,w tL , and how 
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much of its income to allocate to consumption tc (at price pc,t), own farm enterprise 
inputs tm ,(at price pm,t) and savings ts .  The households objective at any given period 
τ is to maximize expected lifetime utility from that period forward.  
 
 ( , )t t t
t
E U cτ
τ
β∞ −
=
∑ l  (1) 
   
The household has access to a concave agricultural production technology f, 
which can be used to transform purchased inputs tm , family labor ,f tL and hired labor 
Lh,t (for simplicity we assume these are equivalent and denote their sum tL ) into 
following-period output 1ty + , subject to an exogenous shock which is realized at time 
t+1.  Output can be consumed by the household or sold at the same price as the 
consumption good, pc.  
 
 1 1( , , )t t t ty f L m γ+ +=  (2) 
 
At the beginning of each period, the household realizes its stochastic non-wage 
income ,c t tp y⋅  and transfer income tφ , which includes food aid.  In addition, the 
household has at its disposal savings from the previous period 1ts −  and may choose to 
allocate some of its time to wage labor ,w tL , paid immediately at wage tw .  Savings ts  
is constrained to be non-negative, i.e. borrowing is not possible.31  Since utility is 
strictly increasing in consumption, the budget constraint binds with equality: 
 
 , , 1 , ,( ) ( )c t t t m t t t t t t w t h tp c y p m s s w L Lφ−⋅ − + ⋅ + = + + ⋅ −  (3) 
 
                                                
31 This reflects reality for most households in Malawi.  In a nationally representative survey only 12 
percent of households claimed to have no need for farming or business credit over the past year, and 
only 11 borrowed for these purposes (IHS-2, 2005). 
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A time constraint limits leisure to be less than or equal to the total time 
endowment T minus the time spent on own farm production and wage labor.  Again 
from the assumption that utility is strictly increasing in consumption, the time 
constraint binds: 
 
 , ,t f t w tL L T+ + =l  (4) 
 
Assuming that the production technology satisfies the Inada conditions ensures 
that own enterprise production labor and inputs are non-zero.  For simplicity, we 
assume efficient labor markets such that households buy and sell exactly as much 
labor as they wish.  A non-negativity constraint on leisure completes the model. 
The first order conditions are standard.  The immediate consumption value of 
wage labor, the discounted expected marginal consumption value of own farm labor, 
and the marginal value of leisure plus the shadow value of its inequality constraint 
,tλl are equated: 
 
 1 1 ,
, 1
t t t t t
t
t c t t t t
u w u y uE
c p c L
δ δ δ δβ λδ δ δ δ
+ +
+
 
⋅ = ⋅ = + 
 
l
l
. (5) 
 
The expected value product of inputs in the next period is equated with the 
opportunity cost of inputs in terms of current consumption:  
 
 , 1 1
, 1
m tt t t
t c t t t
pu u yE
c p c m
δ δ δβδ δ δ
+ +
+
 
⋅ = ⋅ 
 
. (6) 
Finally, the marginal utility of consumption minus the shadow value of credit 
is equal to the expected marginal utility of consumption in the following period: 
 1,
1
t t
s t
t t
u uE
c c
δ δλ βδ δ
+
+
 
− =  
 
. (7) 
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This simple model captures several of the possible ways in which food aid 
might affect agricultural household behavior.  From the budget and time constraints 
(3) and (4), and noting that yt has been determined in the previous period (conditional 
on the exogenous production shock), we can see that a positive shock to transfer 
income tdφ  results in a commensurate increase in the sum of expenditures on current 
consumption, own farm inputs, time devoted to leisure and savings carried over to the 
next period:   
 
 , , , , ,( ) ( ) [ ( )]t c t t m t t t t t t f t h td d p c d p m ds d w L Lφ = ⋅ + ⋅ + + + +l . (8) 
 
Barring a simultaneous large positive shock to production, current 
consumption will increase.  We trace the implications of this adjustment on production 
decisions through the first order conditions. 
Note that the effect of the aid shock may be mitigated through price 
adjustments.  In this partial equilibrium analysis, we do not attempt to model these, but 
rather simply acknowledge their possible existence.  As shown by equation (5), the 
decrease in t
t
u
c
δ
δ  as tc  increases may be offset by an aid-induced decrease in 
,c tp and/or an increase in the wage rate tw .  Assuming the fall in marginal utility of 
consumption is not completely offset in this way, current leisure time will increase if 
the non-negativity constraint on leisure is not binding.   
The expected marginal utility value of own farm labor also falls.  This could 
occur through an increase in expected consumption in the following period, an 
increase in own enterprise labor in the present, or both.  Analogously, equation (6) 
predicts an increase in the purchase of own farm cash inputs and / or an increase in 
next periods consumption level. 
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The degree to which production activities are affected by the aid shock 
depends in part on whether the credit constraint binds.  When the household has no 
unmet demand for credit, expected marginal value of consumption at t+1 may adjust 
entirely by increasing savings.  When this is not the case, the shadow value of credit 
will decrease with the aid shock, leading to a smaller adjustment in 1
1
t
t
uE
c
δβ δ
+
+
 
 
 
, and 
thus a larger adjustment in 1t
t
y
L
δ
δ
+  and 1t
t
y
m
δ
δ
+ .  Which behaviors are affected by the 
receipt of aid, and to what degree, are empirical questions to which we now turn. 
 
4.  Data 
We use data from the Second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2), a 
nationally representative survey of 11,280 households in 564 communities across 
Malawi collected over a one-year period from March 2004 to March 2005.  
Information on the survey design and methodology are given in the IHS2 Basic 
Information Document (NSO, 2005).  The IHS2 includes detailed input data (crop-
specific) for the most recent completed cropping year (roughly July to June), including 
expenditures on seeds and fertilizer.  About half of households interviewed gave this 
information for the 2003-2003 year, and half for 2003-2004.   
A time use module covers the past seven days.  From this we calculate the 
number of hours per able-bodied adult spent on various income-generating activities.  
Respondents are asked to recall whether their household received any food aid in each 
of 2001, 2002, and 2003, and to state the volume or value of this aid in 2003.  We do 
not observe the timing of aid within years.  This results in some measurement error 
since most aid is distributed from October to February.  Aid reported in 2003 may 
have be received in January in response to a shock in the 2001-2002 agricultural year, 
or in December after the 2003 harvest was realized. 
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We merge IHS2 household survey data with weather data from 21 rainfall 
stations around the country.  We use the United States Geological Service / Famine 
Early Warning System Network (USGS/FEWS-NET) water requirement saturation 
index (WRSI) for maize.  The WRSI is a crop water accounting system developed by 
the Food and Agriculture Organization for use with station data to monitor water 
supply and demand for a rain-fed crop throughout the growing season (Frere and 
Popov, 1986).  WRSI is calculated using rainfall observations over ten-day intervals 
and assumptions about time of planting and soil water holding capacity.  At the end of 
the growing season, the WRSI is expressed as the percentage of total crop water 
requirement satisfied by rainfall or available soil moisture throughout the growing 
season.  A value of 100 implies full satisfaction of the requirement, with lower values 
indicating the degree of shortfall.   
Figure 4.3 plots maize WRSI averaged over all 21 rainfall stations over the 
period from 1970 to 2003.  Real household consumption expenditure per capita, taken 
from national accounts data (IMF, 2006) closely track the movement of WRSI over 
time.  The index of consumption expenditures shown in the figure normalizes the all-
time high of this series in 1991 to 100. 
Table 4.1 shows the percentage of households benefiting from the main safety 
net programs for the three years preceding the survey.  Including food for work, direct 
cash  
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Figure 4.3. WRSI and Household Consumption Data (National Accounts) 
 
 
Table 4.1. Receipt of program benefits (percent of households reporting) 
 Receipt by year Receipt during 2001-2003 
 2001 2002 2003 
At least 
once 1 time 
2 
times 3 times 
Free food/maize distribution 10.0 15.1 12.5 26.5 17.8 6.3 2.4 
Food/Cash-for-work 1.0 1.8 3.5 5.5 4.9 0.5 0.1 
Starter pack (TIP), rainy 
season 31.7 36.8 40.5 54.1 
   
Starter pack (TIP), dimba 
season 1.8 2.6 3.6 5.5 
   
Starter pack (TIP), rainy & 
dimba     22.7 13.9 20.9 
Source: IHS2 
 
transfers, and supplemental feeding as well as free food aid, 30 percent of households 
received some sort of ex-post transfer during the past three years.  The vast majority of 
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these transfers were in the form of free food aid, received by more than one quarter of 
all households in the years 2001-2003.   However, very few households  only 2.4 %  
received food aid in each of these years, echoing the finding in qualitative work that 
aid is an unreliable safety net.  The mean (median) amount of free food received per 
capita in 2003 by households that received any was 33 kg (21 kg) and amounted to 
4.1% of the value of food consumption among beneficiaries. 
 
5.  Empirical Strategy 
Receipt of food aid is likely correlated with many of the same unobserved 
variables that determine labor supply and input use.  Ability, intertemporal 
preferences, and preferences for leisure may all be correlated with poverty, on which 
food aid is at least partially targeted.  Social connections may increase access to credit 
for inputs as well as the probability of receiving aid.  Omitted variables at the 
community level may also be a problem.  For example, communities with lower 
returns to farm labor or fertilizer due to poor local soil conditions may receive more 
emergency assistance than otherwise equivalent communities. 
To deal with this problem, we employ an instrumental variables (IV) strategy.  
We exploit an apparent mis-prediction of regional need by the major food aid donor in 
Malawi in 2002-2003.  The United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), which contributed 82% of food aid to Malawi in 2002 and 98% in 2003, 
uses food security assessments generated by the Famine Early Warning Systems 
Network (FEWS-NET) to target food aid.  FEWS-NET in turn bases its assessments 
on a variety of data, including meteorological forecasts.  In March of 2002, an El 
Niño-induced drought was forecast for Southern Africa for the 2002-2003 growing 
season, and relief agencies warned that the impending drought would exacerbate a 
mounting food security crisis in the region (IFRC, 2002).  
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The last year before 2002 with below-average WRSI was 2000.  FEWS-NET 
may therefore have used WRSI values from this year to inform its forecast of regional 
need in 2002-2003.32  Indeed, the spatial distribution of weather shocks within Malawi 
does appear to repeat.  For example, WRSI in the 2004 was highly correlated across 
space with WRSI in 2000; controlling for long-term mean WRSI, the partial 
correlation between these two years is significant at p<0.01. 
The OLS regressions reported in Table 4.3 show the partial correlation of aid 
receipt in the years 2001-2003 and WRSI in 2000.  Controlling for long-term mean 
and standard deviation of WRSI, the shock in 2000 was indeed correlated with 
households receipt of aid in 2002 and 2003.  We argue that a weather shock four to 
five years ago is unlikely to affect current labor allocation or input use, and that 
excluding WRSI in 2000 from the first stage of the model is therefore valid.  The 
decaying effect over time of lagged WRSI on consumption and agricultural input use 
can be seen in Tables 4.5a and 4.5b.  While 2002 and 2003 WRSI are significant 
determinants of labor hours and consumption value in 2004-2005, the effect of 2001 
WRSI on these outcomes is not statistically distinguishable from zero. 
We examine the effect of receiving aid in 2003 on consumption, labor supply 
and agricultural input use.  Three different adult labor supply variables are used: hours 
per adult in the past week devoted to own farm activities (a relatively high-risk income 
generating strategy with delayed returns), to unskilled wage labor (immediate returns 
with lower risk), and the total hours spent on income-generating activities, which 
include skilled wage labor as well as own farm, enterprise, unskilled wage labor, and 
ganyu labor.  Ganyu is an institution through which relatively better-off households in 
a community pay those currently in need for piecework labor (Ravallion and Lokshin,  
 
 
                                                
32 I am working on getting confirmation of this hypothesis from FEWS-NET.  
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Table 4.2: Historical relationship of safety nets programs with lagged WRSI 
shock (OLS) 
 Received Food Aid Received Free Inputs 
 2001 2002 2003 2001 2002 2003 
WRSI 2000 (scale of 0-10) -0.004 -0.011** -0.015** 0.003 -0.001 -0.007 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) 
Mean WRSI, 1962-2003 -0.043*** -0.055*** -0.051*** -0.047** -0.071*** -0.071**
 (0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.022) (0.025) 
Standard dev. WRSI, 1962-
2003 -0.043** -0.072** -0.089*** 0.052 0.008 0.014 
 (0.021) (0.027) (0.027) (0.040) (0.041) (0.047) 
Constant 0.557*** 0.803*** 0.806*** 0.634*** 0.977*** 1.062*** 
 (0.136) (0.158) (0.154) (0.214) (0.220) (0.254) 
Number of observations 10,789 10,794 10,812 10,816 10,817 10,819 
Number of clusters 21; 541 21; 541 21; 541 21; 541 21; 541 21; 541 
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.019 0.019 0.020 
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered by enumeration area and meteorological station.  
* p< 0.10; ** <0.05; ***<0.01 
Source: IHS2 and USGS/FEWS-NET 
 
Table 4.3: Amount and source of food aid to Malawi, 2001-2003 
Percent of which from: Year Total (MT) 
US Europe Asia WFP & Other 
2001 48,451.30 63% 15% 5% 4% 
2002 156,240.00 83% 8% 6% 3% 
2003 22,735.90 98% 1% 0% 1% 
Source: FAOSTAT 
 
2005).  Since ganyu may serve as a form of social assistance rather than a traditional 
labor market, we exclude ganyu from our definition of unskilled wage labor. 
Values of the instrument are identical for all households within a given 
enumeration area (EA).  To correct for the downward bias of standard errors on the 
instrumented variable which would otherwise result (Moulton 1990), we use Statas 
cluster command.  This provides an unbiased estimate of the variance-covariance 
matrix in the presence of cluster-correlated data (Williams 2000).  There is clustering 
at both the EA level and the meteorological station level.  However, 21 stations are too 
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Table 4.4. Regression summary statistics 
 Mean 
Standard 
deviation Minimum Maximum 
Dependent variables     
consumption expenditure (USD pc / yr) 183.75 140.59 13.07 2564.62 
income generating hrs/wk/able-bodied adult 21.94 14.63 0.00 123.00 
own farm hrs/wk/able-bodied adult 14.64 12.48 0.00 76.00 
unskilled wage hrs/wk/able-bodied adult 1.81 6.59 0.00 60.00 
expenditure on seed last season (USD) 1.65 4.15 0.00 94.53 
expenditure on fertilizer last season (USD)  15.85 43.12 0.00 719.39 
Received food aid 2003 0.20 0.40 0.00 1.00 
Water requirement saturation index (WRSI), scale 
of 0-2     
WRSI at nearest met station 2000 8.24 1.05 5.30 9.90 
WRSI 2001 9.31 0.67 7.90 10.00 
WRSI 2002 8.89 1.24 5.40 10.00 
WRSI 2003 9.17 1.01 6.10 10.00 
WRSI 2004 7.68 1.86 4.60 10.00 
mean WRSI, 1963-2004 8.57 0.95 6.34 9.75 
long-term standard deviation of WRSI, 1963-2004 1.33 0.50 0.51 2.30 
Household controls     
household size 4.72 2.37 1.00 27.00 
female head 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 
# members 65+ years of age 0.24 0.52 0.00 3.00 
disabled household member 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 
chronic illness of adult  0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
education of head (yrs) 3.77 3.62 0.00 18.00 
#  rooms in dwelling 2.60 1.26 0.00 10.00 
land owned (ha) 1.23 0.99 0.00 15.38 
livestock (TLU) 0.61 1.83 0.00 41.10 
Community controls     
time to trading center (hrs) 0.90 0.66 0.00 4.34 
larger market in community 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
ADMARC in community 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00 
EA population density, 1998 (population per km 
squared / 100)  0.44 1.96 0.01 40.58 
district population density, 1998 0.80 1.24 0.12 6.55 
district headcount poverty rate, 1998 0.65 0.10 0.47 0.82 
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Table 4.5a. OLS and Tobit regressions, standard errors clustered by EA 
 
Cons. 
expenditure a  
(USD pc/yr)  
Total labor a 
(hrs/week)  
Own farm 
labor b 
(hrs/wk) 
Unskilled 
wage labor b 
(hrs/wk) 
Expenditure 
on seed b 
(USD)  
Expenditure on 
fertilizer b 
(USD)  
received aid 2003 7.658 -0.356 -0.422 -2.181 0.010 2.178 
 (5.414) (0.662) (0.670) (2.599) (0.346) (2.883) 
WRSI 2001 (0-10) -6.486 -1.059 -1.132 3.417 0.886** 2.281 
 (6.747) (1.289) (1.329) (2.893) (0.425) (4.857) 
WRSI 2002 (0-10) 2.421 -1.461** -0.764 -4.684** -0.153 -7.063** 
 (4.819) (0.689) (0.706) (2.013) (0.264) (3.064) 
WRSI 2003 (0-10) -6.142 -2.134*** -2.867*** 3.953** -0.140 4.330 
 (5.407) (0.647) (0.691) (1.988) (0.279) (3.373) 
WRSI 2004 (0-10) 0.973 -1.188** -0.488 -0.483 0.169 3.090 
 (3.112) (0.487) (0.517) (1.282) (0.173) (2.181) 
long-term mean 
WRSI -4.883 6.529*** 6.818*** -0.938 -0.982 10.228 
 (15.549) (1.875) (1.975) (4.748) (0.676) (7.991) 
long-term std. dev.  
WRSI 11.965 2.727 6.747** -17.821** -3.477*** 26.459* 
 (27.327) (3.106) (3.306) (8.732) (1.163) (14.254) 
household size -29.371*** -0.146 0.044 1.511*** 0.155*** 0.238 
 (1.348) (0.119) (0.112) (0.433) (0.051) (0.595) 
female head -14.476*** -3.415*** -2.996*** -9.774*** -0.754*** -5.165** 
 (4.928) (0.646) (0.630) (2.732) (0.278) (2.320) 
# members 65+ years 
of age -12.985*** -3.804*** -2.846*** -6.498** -0.735*** -5.348** 
 (3.530) (0.538) (0.580) (2.883) (0.246) (2.075) 
disabled household 
member -6.866 -6.444*** -5.319*** -6.855* 0.324 -7.845** 
 (4.586) (0.833) (0.864) (3.818) (0.406) (3.269) 
chronic illness of 
adult  10.690* -0.965 -0.366 -4.555* 0.375 0.062 
 (6.382) (0.658) (0.619) (2.470) (0.312) (2.748) 
education of head 
(yrs) 4.978*** -0.035 -0.216*** 0.010 0.154*** 2.147*** 
 (0.765) (0.077) (0.078) (0.304) (0.040) (0.355) 
#  rooms in dwelling 13.790*** -0.660*** -0.138 -1.675 0.192 6.221*** 
 (2.515) (0.238) (0.229) (1.028) (0.126) (1.307) 
land owned (ha) 14.685*** 0.215 1.804*** -4.247** 1.891*** 16.370*** 
 (4.054) (0.511) (0.525) (2.080) (0.329) (3.485) 
land owned (ha) 
squared 0.400 -0.047 -0.177*** 0.252 -0.208*** 0.328 
 (0.591) (0.049) (0.063) (0.223) (0.057) (0.515) 
livestock (TLU) 12.419*** -0.337 0.098 -0.487 0.558*** 8.238*** 
 (2.413) (0.239) (0.224) (1.056) (0.175) (1.916) 
TLU squared -0.381*** 0.011 -0.002 0.037 -0.018** -0.388*** 
 (0.088) (0.008) (0.007) (0.034) (0.008) (0.116) 
time to trading center 
(hrs) -12.038*** -0.370 0.961 -4.486* -0.389 -0.103** 
 (4.152) (0.602) (0.598) (2.533) (0.339) (0.048) 
larger market in 
community 0.501 0.369 -1.112 1.780 -0.116 -3.023 
 (7.821) (0.825) (0.884) (2.902) (0.399) (4.041) 
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Table 4.5a (Continued) 
 
Cons. 
expenditure a  
(USD pc/yr)  
Total labor a 
(hrs/week)  
Own farm 
labor b 
(hrs/wk) 
Unskilled 
wage labor b 
(hrs/wk) 
Expenditure 
on seed b 
(USD)  
Expenditure on 
fertilizer b 
(USD)  
ADMARC in 
community -2.908 0.652 -0.311 2.070 0.996** -3.346 
 (7.681) (1.000) (1.016) (3.020) (0.489) (5.091) 
EA population 
density 14.935*** 0.175 -2.123*** 0.731 0.102 1.736 
 (5.223) (0.529) (0.694) (1.181) (0.155) (1.550) 
EA pop. density 
squared -0.349** -0.002 0.050** -0.004 -0.003 -0.062 
 (0.141) (0.017) (0.024) (0.042) (0.006) (0.057) 
district pop. density 6.540** -1.105*** -1.401*** 1.430 0.138 1.199 
 (2.643) (0.314) (0.373) (0.930) (0.134) (1.559) 
district poverty rate 
1998 110.343*** 2.867 -0.693 9.226 -3.107 91.978*** 
 (34.648) (5.197) (5.330) (15.222) (2.282) (25.803) 
constant 263.853* 17.751 -1.708 -44.888 -0.202 -237.882*** 
 (136.633) (16.805) (18.018) (46.600) (5.658) (82.800) 
Number of 
observations 3,702 3,514 3,514 3,514 3,702 3,702 
Number of clusters 440 438 438 438 440 440 
Quarter of year and region fixed effects.  
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%. aOLS, bTobit.  
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Table 4.5b. OLS and Tobit regressions, standard errors clustered by EA and met station 
 
Cons. 
expenditure a  
(USD pc/yr)  
Total labor a 
(hrs/week)  
Own farm 
labor b 
(hrs/wk) 
Unskilled 
wage labor b 
(hrs/wk) 
Expenditure 
on seed b 
(USD)  
Expenditure on 
fertilizer b 
(USD)  
received aid 2003 8.846 -0.461 -0.504 -1.786 0.027 2.060 
 (5.476) (0.656) (0.657) (2.573) (0.345) (2.950) 
WRSI 2001 (0-10) -4.099 -0.160 -0.615 3.097 0.578 5.557 
 (6.522) (1.201) (1.313) (2.578) (0.338) (3.599) 
WRSI 2002 (0-10) 4.721 -1.768** -0.958 -4.299** -0.114 -5.033* 
 (4.761) (0.680) (0.724) (1.955) (0.250) (2.791) 
WRSI 2003 (0-10) -2.012 -2.184*** -2.925*** 4.454** -0.284 7.344*** 
 (5.136) (0.593) (0.661) (1.904) (0.210) (2.599) 
WRSI 2004 (0-10) 7.070** -1.172** -0.825 0.514 0.150 5.752*** 
 (2.987) (0.482) (0.537) (1.333) (0.160) (1.889) 
long-term mean 
WRSI -7.470 6.058*** 6.682*** -1.786 -1.012 6.296 
 (14.791) (1.874) (1.991) (4.681) (0.633) (6.776) 
long-term std. dev. 
WRSI 25.532 1.478 6.065* -18.710** -4.015*** 31.731*** 
 (24.829) (3.038) (3.358) (8.721) (1.144) (11.326) 
household size -29.305*** -0.110 0.082 1.586*** 0.157*** 0.231 
 (1.363) (0.116) (0.109) (0.437) (0.052) (0.584) 
female head -10.745** -3.312*** -3.163*** -9.140*** -0.701** -3.444 
 (4.861) (0.655) (0.685) (2.703) (0.272) (2.305) 
# members 65+ years 
of age -11.065*** -3.866*** -3.127*** -6.281** -0.697** -4.685** 
 (3.712) (0.539) (0.593) (2.920) (0.246) (2.047) 
disabled household 
member -3.592 -6.504*** -5.657*** -6.782* 0.411 -6.538** 
 (4.911) (0.835) (0.884) (3.858) (0.400) (3.220) 
chronic illness of 
adult  15.510** -1.305* -0.886 -3.946 0.391 1.525 
 (6.071) (0.660) (0.626) (2.438) (0.307) (2.679) 
education of head 
(yrs) 6.037*** -0.060 -0.353*** 0.168 0.166*** 2.266*** 
 (0.763) (0.079) (0.083) (0.302) (0.040) (0.359) 
#  rooms in dwelling 14.463*** -0.817*** -0.392 -1.551 0.240* 6.007*** 
 (2.505) (0.236) (0.242) (1.046) (0.125) (1.285) 
land owned (ha) 9.773** 0.126 2.281*** -5.329** 1.843*** 14.636*** 
 (4.492) (0.493) (0.569) (2.095) (0.322) (3.142) 
land owned (ha) 
squared 0.877 -0.043 -0.228*** 0.363 -0.204*** 0.494 
 (0.522) (0.049) (0.079) (0.215) (0.057) (0.473) 
livestock (TLU) 11.857*** -0.303 0.192 -0.736 0.535*** 8.195*** 
 (2.322) (0.247) (0.231) (1.092) (0.171) (1.871) 
TLU squared -0.377*** 0.010 -0.004 0.044 -0.017** -0.400*** 
 (0.085) (0.009) (0.007) (0.035) (0.008) (0.111) 
constant 217.182 18.768 -1.223 -48.246 2.114 -251.859*** 
 (132.918) (16.416) (18.157) (47.984) (5.201) (61.872) 
Number of 
observations 3,717 3,527 3,527 3,527 3,717 3,717 
Number of clusters 21; 440 21; 440 21; 438 21; 438 21; 438 21; 438 
Region fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%.  
aOLS, bTobit.  
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few to for the asymptotic properties of this estimator, which rely on a large number of 
clusters, to be valid.  Acknowledging that neither of method is ideal, we present two 
sets of results: the first with standard errors clustered by EA and the second with 
standard errors clustered by EA and meteorological station.  For the latter, we exclude 
community-level controls and quarter of year dummies to conserve degrees of 
freedom.33   
Food aid is not the only transfer program in Malawi likely to affect agricultural 
production decisions.  Over half of the households in Malawi received free inputs 
through the Starter Pack or Targeted Inputs Program from 2001-2003 (Table 4.1).  
Correlation in the targeting of these two programs could potentially confound our 
results.  We therefore limit our analysis to households that received free inputs in 
2003.  The estimated effects of receiving food aid can therefore be interpreted as 
additional to any possible effect on production behavior of the free inputs program. 
 
6. Results 
We begin by treating aid receipt as exogenous.  Tables 4.7a and 4.7b report the 
results of OLS regressions for consumption expenditures and total labor hours and 
Tobit regressions for specific labor activities and input use, for which a significant 
number of observations are zero.  Under the assumption of treatment exogeneity, 
receiving aid has no significant effect on any of the outcomes considered.  Because the 
inclusion of aid receipt in these models may bias the estimated coefficients on 
controls, we reserve discussion of these for the two-stage models. 
 
 
                                                
33 Estimating cluster-robust standard errors with M clusters allows identification of no more than M-1 
(plus a constant) parameters.  
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Table 4.6. IV First stage regressions: Received food aid in 2003 (OLS) 
SEs clustered by: Enumeration Area (EA) EA and met station 
Model: consumption labor inputs cons & inputs labor 
WRSI 2000 -0.040*** -0.039*** -0.043*** -0.043*** -0.042*** 
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
WRSI 2001 (0-10) 0.010 0.006 0.005 -0.025 -0.027 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) 
WRSI 2002 (0-10) 0.023 0.030* 0.023 0.031* 0.038** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) 
WRSI 2003 (0-10) 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013) (0.013) 
WRSI 2004 (0-10) -0.010 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.007 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
long-term mean WRSI -0.064* -0.078** -0.055 -0.044 -0.059 
 (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038) 
long-term std. dev.  WRSI -0.034 -0.040 -0.008 0.000 -0.014 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.071) (0.066) (0.066) 
household size 0.002 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
female head 0.055*** 0.049*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 0.054*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) 
# members 65+ years of age 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.074*** 0.076*** 0.072*** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) 
disabled household member 0.071*** 0.069*** 0.073*** 0.073*** 0.072*** 
 (0.023) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.024) 
chronic illness of adult  0.052*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.066*** 0.069*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) 
education of head (yrs) -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
#  rooms in dwelling 0.011 0.013* 0.012 0.014** 0.016** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
land owned (ha) 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
land owned (ha) squared -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
livestock (TLU) -0.013** -0.013** -0.015** -0.015** -0.016** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
TLU squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
time to trading center (hrs) -0.025** -0.027** -0.023*   
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.013)   
larger market in community 0.009 0.009 0.011   
 (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)   
ADMARC in community -0.009 -0.010 -0.011   
 (0.026) (0.025) (0.027)   
EA population density -0.017 -0.016 -0.016   
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)   
EA pop. density squared 0.000 0.000 0.000   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
district pop. density 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.027***   
 (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)   
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Table 4.6 (Continued) 
SEs clustered by: Enumeration Area (EA) EA and met station 
district poverty rate 1998 -0.116 -0.133 -0.105   
 (0.128) (0.125) (0.132)   
constant 0.689** 0.749** 0.578* 0.623* 0.695** 
 (0.318) (0.316) (0.335) (0.334) (0.333) 
Number of observations 3,702 3,514 3,702 3,717 3,527 
Number of clusters 440 438 440 21; 440 21; 438 
F-statistic, WRSI 2000=0 10.25 10.33 11.10 10.68 10.63 
 
 
Table 4.7a. 2SLS second stage, standard errors clustered by EA 
 
Cons. 
expenditure  
(USD pc/yr)  
Total labor 
(hrs/week) 
Own farm 
labor (hrs/wk)
Unskilled 
wage labor 
(hrs/wk) 
Expenditure on 
seed 
(USD)  
Expenditure 
on fertilizer 
 (USD)  
received aid 2003 51.694 64.785** 58.437** -11.555** 9.199** -4.209 
 (111.086) (26.633) (23.773) (5.796) (3.926) (26.756) 
WRSI 2001 (0-10) -7.522 -2.317 -2.185 0.371 0.128 0.010 
 (6.924) (2.011) (1.791) (0.436) (0.269) (2.322) 
WRSI 2002 (0-10) 2.014 -2.561** -1.806 -0.183 -0.022 -6.543*** 
 (5.218) (1.276) (1.195) (0.284) (0.167) (1.651) 
WRSI 2003 (0-10) -6.903 -3.324*** -3.613*** 0.557** -0.106 0.038 
 (6.320) (1.209) (1.148) (0.276) (0.187) (1.854) 
WRSI 2004 (0-10) 0.718 -1.712** -1.039 -0.023 -0.014 0.077 
 (3.068) (0.849) (0.736) (0.206) (0.128) (0.905) 
long-term mean 
WRSI -1.677 12.163*** 11.410*** -0.766 -0.274 8.307** 
 (20.372) (4.084) (3.872) (0.813) (0.478) (3.658) 
long-term std. dev.  
WRSI 13.909 6.047 8.907 -2.279* -1.545* 12.205** 
 (29.543) (5.718) (5.439) (1.322) (0.835) (5.759) 
household size -29.461*** -0.319 -0.267 0.027 0.005 0.179 
 (1.355) (0.273) (0.234) (0.061) (0.044) (0.371) 
female head -16.981** -6.770*** -5.203*** -0.347 -0.810** -2.068 
 (8.472) (1.795) (1.558) (0.449) (0.325) (2.003) 
# members 65+ years 
of age -16.112* -8.224*** -6.182*** 0.124 -0.952*** -1.726 
 (8.294) (2.151) (1.922) (0.447) (0.319) (2.045) 
disabled household 
member -10.068 -11.047*** -8.517*** 0.245 -0.444 -2.930 
 (9.897) (2.558) (2.304) (0.588) (0.388) (2.602) 
chronic illness of 
adult  8.330 -4.704** -3.863** 0.016 -0.517* -1.115 
 (7.513) (1.969) (1.743) (0.427) (0.278) (2.013) 
education of head 
(yrs) 4.993*** -0.048 -0.189 -0.025 0.074*** 1.003*** 
 (0.784) (0.142) (0.128) (0.043) (0.026) (0.215) 
#  rooms in dwelling 13.400*** -1.321** -0.795 -0.037 0.124 3.282*** 
 (2.882) (0.588) (0.509) (0.133) (0.099) (0.843) 
land owned (ha) 14.434*** -0.231 1.007 -0.481* 0.755*** 6.409*** 
 (4.078) (0.979) (0.820) (0.267) (0.185) (1.958) 
land owned (ha) 
squared 0.508 0.116 0.007 0.018 -0.037 1.075*** 
 (0.707) (0.136) (0.111) (0.031) (0.024) (0.380) 
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Table 4.7a (Continued) 
 
Cons. 
expenditure  
(USD pc/yr)  
Total labor 
(hrs/week) 
Own farm 
labor (hrs/wk)
Unskilled 
wage labor 
(hrs/wk) 
Expenditure on 
seed 
(USD)  
Expenditure 
on fertilizer 
 (USD)  
livestock (TLU) 12.877*** 0.365 0.753 -0.245* 0.471*** 4.900*** 
 (2.692) (0.570) (0.508) (0.133) (0.140) (1.390) 
TLU squared -0.385*** 0.004 -0.008 0.006 -0.012*** -0.178*** 
 (0.090) (0.016) (0.013) (0.004) (0.005) (0.062) 
time to trading center 
(hrs) -11.001** 1.326 2.375** -0.996*** 0.180 -0.028 
 (4.414) (1.298) (1.117) (0.308) (0.198) (0.020) 
larger market in 
community -0.264 -0.792 -1.850 0.372 -0.242 -0.685 
 (7.557) (1.719) (1.539) (0.442) (0.278) (1.902) 
ADMARC in 
community -2.320 1.638 0.509 0.068 0.637* -0.645 
 (7.532) (1.882) (1.727) (0.500) (0.356) (2.465) 
EA population 
density 15.657*** 1.197 -0.080 -0.209 0.207* 0.024 
 (5.511) (1.047) (0.818) (0.267) (0.125) (0.637) 
EA pop. density 
squared -0.361** -0.019 0.008 0.010 -0.005 0.001 
 (0.144) (0.030) (0.024) (0.011) (0.004) (0.016) 
district pop. density 5.161 -3.005*** -2.735*** 0.457** -0.184 0.920 
 (4.365) (1.096) (0.911) (0.221) (0.173) (1.327) 
district poverty rate 
1998 112.798*** 7.700 3.671 -1.677 -0.359 28.571** 
 (35.865) (9.280) (8.495) (2.145) (1.628) (12.899) 
constant 244.864 -14.829 -27.276 9.498 0.918 -45.476 
 (161.495) (30.420) (29.814) (6.605) (3.939) (36.534) 
Number of 
observations 3,702 3,514 3,514 3,514 3,702 3,702 
Number of clusters 440 438 438 438 440 440 
Quarter of year and region fixed effects.  
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%.  
 
Table 4.7b. 2SLS second stage, standard errors clustered by EA and met station 
 
Cons. 
expenditure  
(USD pc/yr) 
Total labor 
(hrs/week) 
Own farm 
labor (hrs/wk)
Unskilled 
wage labor 
(hrs/wk) 
Expenditure on 
seed (USD)  
Expenditure 
on fertilizer 
(USD)  
received aid 2003 108.616 53.388** 48.216** -10.884* 8.172** 10.614 
 (111.721) (23.206) (21.914) (5.600) (3.617) (22.503) 
WRSI 2001 (0-10) -3.383 0.420 -0.110 -0.103 0.260 0.898 
 (6.826) (1.800) (1.696) (0.349) (0.219) (1.541) 
WRSI 2002 (0-10) 2.941 -3.105** -2.151* -0.108 -0.056 -6.141*** 
 (5.756) (1.145) (1.097) (0.276) (0.142) (1.663) 
WRSI 2003 (0-10) -4.320 -3.407*** -3.699*** 0.510* -0.096 0.913 
 (6.421) (1.064) (1.026) (0.254) (0.150) (1.340) 
WRSI 2004 (0-10) 6.125* -1.780** -1.345* 0.081 -0.002 0.832 
 (2.999) (0.851) (0.763) (0.209) (0.110) (0.726) 
long-term mean 
WRSI -1.842 9.884** 9.618** -0.529 -0.428 8.219** 
 (18.465) (3.616) (3.508) (0.737) (0.433) (3.277) 
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Table 4.7b (Continued) 
 
Cons. 
expenditure  
(USD pc/yr) 
Total labor 
(hrs/week) 
Own farm 
labor (hrs/wk)
Unskilled 
wage labor 
(hrs/wk) 
Expenditure on 
seed (USD)  
Expenditure 
on fertilizer 
(USD)  
long-term std. dev. 
WRSI 26.088 2.530 6.306 -2.180* -1.733** 15.182*** 
 (25.579) (4.764) (4.595) (1.232) (0.774) (4.861) 
household size -29.586*** -0.293 -0.248 0.036 0.013 0.141 
 (1.406) (0.248) (0.212) (0.060) (0.041) (0.364) 
female head -17.115* -6.449*** -5.137*** -0.238 -0.761** -2.455 
 (8.803) (1.599) (1.418) (0.457) (0.302) (1.852) 
# members 65+ years 
of age -18.859* -7.836*** -5.991*** 0.180 -0.876*** -2.644 
 (9.153) (1.970) (1.833) (0.452) (0.296) (1.820) 
disabled household 
member -11.083 -10.526*** -8.243*** 0.258 -0.359 -3.828 
 (10.192) (2.275) (2.110) (0.580) (0.371) (2.392) 
chronic illness of 
adult  8.609 -5.180** -4.353** 0.198 -0.521* -1.474 
 (8.757) (1.973) (1.797) (0.486) (0.294) (2.013) 
education of head 
(yrs) 6.019*** -0.095 -0.309** 0.001 0.078*** 1.055*** 
 (0.788) (0.123) (0.112) (0.042) (0.024) (0.205) 
#  rooms in dwelling 13.323*** -1.516*** -1.023** 0.019 0.127 3.059*** 
 (3.122) (0.531) (0.483) (0.141) (0.095) (0.821) 
land owned (ha) 9.201* -0.259 1.345* -0.575** 0.767*** 5.839*** 
 (4.746) (0.816) (0.687) (0.263) (0.173) (1.773) 
land owned (ha) 
squared 1.108 0.085 -0.058 0.031 -0.042* 1.157*** 
 (0.655) (0.111) (0.094) (0.029) (0.022) (0.381) 
livestock (TLU) 13.133*** 0.425 0.863* -0.292** 0.457*** 5.084*** 
 (2.802) (0.520) (0.472) (0.140) (0.131) (1.320) 
TLU squared -0.395*** -0.001 -0.014 0.008* -0.012** -0.184*** 
 (0.089) (0.015) (0.013) (0.004) (0.004) (0.060) 
constant 184.130 -3.546 -17.513 8.540 1.448 -59.672** 
 (153.270) (26.470) (26.166) (6.276) (3.684) (28.123) 
Number of 
observations 3717 3527 3527 3527 3717 3717 
Number of clusters 21; 440 21; 440 21; 438 21; 438 21; 438 21; 438 
Region fixed effects. Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
Turning now to the first stage of these, WRSI in 2000 is indeed significantly 
correlated with receipt of food aid in 2003, with an F-statistic of between 10.25 and 
11.1, depending on which controls are included and which assumptions are made 
about the error structure (Table 4.7).  A 10% shortfall in WRSI in 2000 decrease 
implied a 0.4% conditional increase in the probability of receiving aid in 2003.  WRSI 
in 2003 is correlated with aid receipt, but in the opposite direction: better growing 
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conditions are associated with higher probability of receiving food aid.  The programs 
stated targeting criteria of targeting female-headed households, the elderly, and those 
with chronically ill members appear to have been effectively implemented, with all 
three of these characteristics increasing the probability of receiving food aid.  
Households with disabled members were also more likely to receive aid.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, households living in dwellings with more rooms were more likely to 
receive aid, controlling for household size, which had no effect.  Livestock ownership 
was negatively associated with aid receipt.34  Finally, higher population density at the 
district level, though not within the enumeration area, was associated with aid receipt. 
Because of the sensitivity of Tobit models to distributional assumptions, we 
present results of both a linear two stage least squares model (Tables 4.8a and 4.8b), 
and an IV Tobit specification for the censored dependent variables (Tables 4.8a and 
4.8b).  All of the IV specifications use a linear first stage equation to predict the binary 
variable indicating receipt of food aid in 2003, as this generates consistent second-
stage estimates and is less vulnerable to misspecification bias than a nonlinear first 
stage functional form (Angrist and Krueger, 2001).  For the most part, similar results 
obtain with the Tobit and linear specifications.   
Implicit in the use of 2000 WRSI as an instrument for aid is the assumption 
that a 2000 weather shock does not affect agricultural input choice in 2002-2003 or 
2003-2004, or labor supply in 2004-2005.  The results shown in Tables 4.8a through 
4.9b provide suggestive evidence to support this assumption.  While WRSI in 2003 is 
correlated with most of the dependent variables, and WRSI in 2002 is correlated with 
some, WRSI three years ago in 2001 is not significantly correlated with any input or  
 
                                                
34 Livestock holdings are measured in 2004-2005, so this may be endogenous; we are less concerned 
with establishing causal relationships in the first stage than we are with including appropriate controls 
in the second stage regressions. 
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Table 4.8a. IV Tobit second stage, standard errors clustered by EA 
 Own farm labor (hrs/wk) 
Unskilled wage labor 
(hrs/wk) 
Expenditure on 
seed (USD)  
Expenditure on 
fertilizer (USD) 
received aid 2003 66.266** -69.704 28.027** -77.909 
 (26.804) (48.838) (11.135) (64.515) 
WRSI 2001 (0-10) -2.434 4.679 0.268 4.014 
 (1.983) (3.410) (0.750) (5.514) 
WRSI 2002 (0-10) -1.890 -3.494 -0.402 -6.339* 
 (1.340) (2.390) (0.476) (3.311) 
WRSI 2003 (0-10) -4.096*** 4.985** -0.757 6.125 
 (1.294) (2.522) (0.558) (4.123) 
WRSI 2004 (0-10) -1.040 -0.039 -0.088 3.760 
 (0.830) (1.376) (0.351) (2.344) 
long-term mean WRSI 12.600*** -6.533 0.883 4.974 
 (4.299) (7.195) (1.424) (9.159) 
long-term std. dev.  WRSI 10.150* -20.847* -2.919 24.863 
 (6.131) (10.780) (2.382) (15.144) 
household size -0.139 1.682*** 0.067 0.486 
 (0.266) (0.486) (0.115) (0.666) 
female head -6.438*** -6.358* -2.455*** -0.356 
 (1.786) (3.827) (0.904) (4.546) 
# members 65+ years of age -7.363*** -1.848 -2.853*** 0.704 
 (2.175) (4.274) (0.940) (5.108) 
disabled household member -10.040*** -2.208 -1.739 -1.873 
 (2.656) (5.771) (1.065) (5.941) 
chronic illness of adult  -4.177** -0.605 -1.248* 4.711 
 (1.960) (3.906) (0.749) (4.819) 
education of head (yrs) -0.229 0.012 0.158** 2.146*** 
 (0.147) (0.341) (0.066) (0.397) 
#  rooms in dwelling -0.808 -1.000 -0.071 6.966*** 
 (0.579) (1.175) (0.256) (1.587) 
land owned (ha) 1.337 -3.776* 1.608*** 16.977*** 
 (0.938) (2.197) (0.495) (3.747) 
land owned (ha) squared -0.009 0.081 -0.119 0.119 
 (0.125) (0.255) (0.081) (0.552) 
livestock (TLU) 0.815 -1.220 0.913*** 7.262*** 
 (0.581) (1.265) (0.312) (2.101) 
TLU squared -0.008 0.044 -0.023** -0.376*** 
 (0.015) (0.038) (0.011) (0.113) 
time to trading center (hrs) 2.692** -6.156** 0.219 -0.133** 
 (1.269) (2.809) (0.567) (0.057) 
larger market in community -2.291 2.952 -0.656 -1.433 
 (1.761) (3.392) (0.802) (4.535) 
ADMARC in community 0.677 1.169 1.434 -4.728 
 (1.991) (3.548) (0.903) (5.997) 
EA population density -1.095 -0.329 0.548 0.498 
 (1.100) (1.541) (0.341) (2.052) 
EA pop. density squared 0.033 0.014 -0.012 -0.040 
 (0.034) (0.049) (0.011) (0.067) 
district pop. density -3.356*** 3.355** -0.701 3.623 
 (1.020) (1.692) (0.462) (2.463) 
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Table 4.8a (Continued) 
 Own farm labor (hrs/wk) 
Unskilled wage labor 
(hrs/wk) 
Expenditure on 
seed (USD)  
Expenditure on 
fertilizer (USD) 
district poverty rate 1998 4.312 4.599 -2.078 89.104*** 
 (9.678) (17.553) (4.179) (27.724) 
constant -34.820 -11.303 -8.572 -214.186** 
 (33.425) (61.105) (11.733) (91.237) 
Number of observations 3,514 3,514 3,702 3,702 
Number of clusters 438 438 440 440 
Quarter of year and region fixed effects.  
Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 5%, *** 1%.  
 
Table 4.8b. IV Tobit second stage, standard errors clustered by EA and met 
station 
 Own farm labor (hrs/wk) 
Unskilled wage labor 
(hrs/wk) 
Expenditure on 
seed (USD)  
Expenditure on 
fertilizer (USD) 
received aid 2003 53.140** -58.445 23.609** -22.327 
 (24.633) (45.588) (9.828) (55.854) 
WRSI 2001 (0-10) -0.044 2.499 0.678 5.423 
 (1.900) (2.951) (0.586) (3.760) 
WRSI 2002 (0-10) -2.287* -2.832 -0.533 -4.585 
 (1.225) (2.331) (0.397) (2.985) 
WRSI 2003 (0-10) -4.146*** 5.552** -0.835* 7.908** 
 (1.140) (2.377) (0.441) (2.954) 
WRSI 2004 (0-10) -1.438 1.041 -0.097 5.978*** 
 (0.869) (1.438) (0.284) (1.997) 
long-term mean WRSI 10.492** -5.517 0.378 4.867 
 (3.864) (6.378) (1.233) (7.488) 
long-term std. dev. WRSI 7.101 -19.269* -3.868* 31.512** 
 (5.108) (10.178) (2.031) (11.314) 
household size -0.104 1.778*** 0.090 0.298 
 (0.239) (0.489) (0.101) (0.599) 
female head -6.290*** -5.898 -2.214** -1.900 
 (1.619) (3.874) (0.808) (4.135) 
# members 65+ years of age -7.072*** -2.035 -2.547*** -2.770 
 (2.052) (4.170) (0.841) (4.565) 
disabled household member -9.673*** -2.688 -1.351 -4.692 
 (2.406) (5.703) (0.947) (5.181) 
chronic illness of adult  -4.739** 0.182 -1.235 3.221 
 (2.008) (4.214) (0.768) (4.708) 
education of head (yrs) -0.388*** 0.195 0.164*** 2.270*** 
 (0.129) (0.328) (0.057) (0.362) 
#  rooms in dwelling -1.085* -0.830 -0.036 6.293*** 
 (0.543) (1.204) (0.234) (1.469) 
land owned (ha) 1.894** -4.915** 1.663*** 14.758*** 
 (0.786) (2.160) (0.448) (3.175) 
land owned (ha) squared -0.100 0.229 -0.138* 0.440 
 (0.109) (0.233) (0.076) (0.488) 
livestock (TLU) 0.915* -1.498 0.837*** 7.893*** 
 (0.530) (1.321) (0.275) (2.051) 
TLU squared -0.014 0.055 -0.021** -0.397*** 
 (0.014) (0.038) (0.009) (0.111) 
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Table 4.8b (Continued) 
 Own farm labor (hrs/wk) 
Unskilled wage labor 
(hrs/wk) 
Expenditure on 
seed (USD)  
Expenditure on 
fertilizer (USD) 
constant -23.283 -25.744 -5.358 -243.688*** 
 (28.889) (59.361) (10.328) (65.674) 
Number of observations 3527 3527 3717 3717 
Number of clusters 21; 438 21; 438 21; 440 21; 440 
 
labor variable.  This suggests that any correlation of WRSI four years ago in 2000 
with the dependent variables will be only through the effect of aid.   
We find that having received food aid in 2003 increases labor supply to own 
farm activities and total income generating activities in 2004/2005.  Aid may also 
decrease unskilled wage labor supply, but this effect is significant only in the linear 
model.   
Aid receipt has a positive effect on seed expenditures, but surprisingly no 
effect on the purchase of fertilizer.  The sign on aid in the fertilizer regression is not 
even stable across specifications.  One possible explanation is that returns to fertilizer 
vary significantly depending on soil quality, with negligible returns at low levels of 
soil organic matter (Marenya and Barrett, 2008).  Perhaps the soils of farmers in our 
sample are too degraded for fertilizer to be profitable.  
The magnitudes of the estimated effects, particularly on the labor supply 
variables, are implausibly large.  This may be due to fact that the excluded instrument, 
with an F-statistic of just over 10 in the first stage, is relatively weak.   
 
7. Conclusion 
Using nationally representative data from Malawi, we have investigated the 
effect of food aid on the agricultural production decisions of smallholders.  Echoing 
previous findings from Ethiopia, we fail to find evidence of a disincentive effect of aid 
on total labor supply.  Rather, households that recently received aid allocated more 
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time to own farm production activities, and indeed more time on income-generating 
activities overall.  Households that received aid also spent more on purchased seeds 
for their farms.   
These results suggest that food aid may alleviate a liquidity constraint during 
the planting season, allowing households to devote more of their limited resources to 
own farm production with a delayed payoff rather than work for a low but immediate 
wage.  Contrary to the received wisdom that food aid may have disincentive effects on 
smallholder agricultural production, our findings point to one mechanism through 
which this type of aid may actually increase smallholder productivity. 
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